Hi all, Just so's you know, Ben and I have been chatting a little about this and Sean and I would be happy to sponsor a BoF on the topic if it looks like it might gain traction and all the other usual things look like they might pan out.
The timing for Atlanta is tight though for a formal BoF so if this is of interest (or if you hate it;-) please speak up in the next week. If we don't get sufficient interest for a formal BoF then we can arrange a room for a side-meeting if that's of any use. Cheers, S. On 09/06/2012 03:32 PM, Ben Laurie wrote: > Would people be interested in starting a WG on Certificate > Transparency? If so, how about a BoF in Atlanta? > > Here's a draft charter... > > > CT IETF WG Draft Charter > > Objective > > Specify mechanisms and techniques that allow Internet applications to > monitor and verify the issuance of public X.509 certificates such that > all public issued certificates are available to applications, and each > certificate seen by an application can be efficiently shown to be in > the log of issued certificates. Furthermore, it should be possible to > cryptographically verify the correct operation of the log. > > > Optionally, do the same for certificate revocations. > > Problem Statement > > Currently it is possible for any CA to issue a certificate for any > site without any oversight. This has led to some high profile > mis-issuance of certificates, such as by DigiNotar, a subsidiary of > VASCO Data Security International, in July 2011 > (http://www.vasco.com/company/about_vasco/press_room/news_archive/2011/news_diginotar_reports_security_incident.aspx). > > > The aim is to make it possible to detect such mis-issuance promptly > through the use of a public log of all public issued certificates. > Domain owners can then monitor this log and, upon detecting > mis-issuance, take appropriate action. > > > This public log must also be able to efficiently demonstrate its own > correct operation, rather than introducing yet another party that must > be trusted into the equation. > > > Clients should also be able to efficiently verify that certificates > they receive have indeed been entered into the public log. > > > For revocations, the aim would be similar: ensure that revocations are > as expected, that clients can efficiently obtain the revocation status > of a certificate and that the log is operating correctly. > > > Also, in both cases, the solution must be usable by browsers - this > means that it cannot add any round trips to page fetches, and that any > data transfers that are mandatory are of a reasonable size. > _______________________________________________ > therightkey mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey > > _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
