Ben, One of the things the transparency depends on is the domain owners and auditors monitoring the logs. Given the size, if things are not verified, mis-issued certificates can fall through the cracks. I have some minor suggestions that may strengthen the transparency I-D further. You are welcome to consider some or all of these below:
1. Discuss this dependency explicitly in the Security Considerations Section. 2. Since the SCT extension has the certification path used by the log, discuss that the relying party optionally can match that with their path albeit the paths could be different in some instances. 3. Include a flag or indication in the SCT extension if the Log has matched one of the CAs in the path authoritative for the domain name if the domain has registered such a CA using out of band means. (I have not fully thought out what the relying party will do if flag says no, but would think that if the Log knows CAs for a domain and the certificate is not a descendant of one of the CAs, log will not automatically include the certificate in the log) 4. Given the structure of SCT, the determination that a CA speaks for domain can be made by Log, Auditor or the relying party if they have a visibility into authorized CAs for the domain. -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Ben Laurie Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 9:46 AM To: [email protected] Subject: [therightkey] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-00.txt ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: <[email protected]> Date: 12 September 2012 14:24 Subject: New Version Notification for draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-00.txt To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected], [email protected] A new version of I-D, draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Ben Laurie and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-laurie-pki-sunlight Revision: 00 Title: Certificate Transparency Creation date: 2012-09-12 WG ID: Individual Submission Number of pages: 16 URL: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-00.txt Status: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-laurie-pki-sunlight Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-00 Abstract: The aim of Certificate Transparency is to have every public end- entity TLS certificate issued by a known Certificate Authority recorded in one or more certificate logs. In order to detect mis- issuance of certificates, all logs are publicly auditable. In particular, domain owners will be able to monitor logs for certificates issued on their own domain. In order to protect clients from unlogged mis-issued certificates, logs sign all recorded certificates, and clients can choose not to trust certificates that are not accompanied by an appropriate log signature. For privacy and performance reasons log signatures are embedded in the TLS handshake via the TLS authorization extension [RFC5878], or in the certificate itself via an X.509v3 certificate extension [RFC5280]. In order to ensure a globally consistent view of the log, logs also provide a global signature over the entire log. Any inconsistency of logs can be detected through cross-checks on the global signature. Logs are only expected to certify that they have seen a certificate and thus, we do not specify any revocation mechanism for log signatures in this document. Logs will be append-only, and log signatures will be valid indefinitely. The IETF Secretariat _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
