On 18 September 2012 15:27, Santosh Chokhani <[email protected]> wrote: > Ben, > > One of the things the transparency depends on is the domain owners and > auditors monitoring the logs. Given the size, if things are not verified, > mis-issued certificates can fall through the cracks. I have some minor > suggestions that may strengthen the transparency I-D further. You are > welcome to consider some or all of these below: > > 1. Discuss this dependency explicitly in the Security Considerations Section.
I'm about to push a revised version, but I'll add something about this. > 2. Since the SCT extension has the certification path used by the log, > discuss that the relying party optionally can match that with their path > albeit the paths could be different in some instances. The SCT does not contain the certification path for exactly this reason. > 3. Include a flag or indication in the SCT extension if the Log has matched > one of the CAs in the path authoritative for the domain name if the domain > has registered such a CA using out of band means. (I have not fully thought > out what the relying party will do if flag says no, but would think that if > the Log knows CAs for a domain and the certificate is not a descendant of one > of the CAs, log will not automatically include the certificate in the log) I presume you're referring to the use of DANE or CAA or something of that nature? In any case, the log's purpose is not to judge the correctness or otherwise of any particular certificate, but to make a public record so that others can judge. That said, the log could include a flag that said "at the time of issuance, the issuing CA was allowed to issue for the domain, by virtue of a CAA record". The log would presumably have to also include a DNSSEC chain showing that this was so. I'm not sure if DNSSEC chains can be effectively timestamped, though, so it would be hard to prevent the log from lying about this. Finally, we have been considering defining an extension mechanism for the log, and this kind of thing seems like it would fit right in. Does anyone have views on this? > 4. Given the structure of SCT, the determination that a CA speaks for domain > can be made by Log, Auditor or the relying party if they have a visibility > into authorized CAs for the domain. Surely this determination is independent of the log? The log could say in the SCT what things looked like at time of submission, but as I say above, the log's function is to record, not judge. _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
