I'm not so sure. What if you has one site, antenna, and transmitter and a dozen signal sources with programmable synthesizers and coders.
The drone antenna is likely omni. The Russians or Chinese could easily supply that. -John ================ > Fascinating. > > I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out > strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could > control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is > very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current > positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there. > > But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it > wouldn't > work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of > transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's > no good. > > It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location. > > Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive. > > Jim > > > On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science >> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy >> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan >> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside >> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to >> the >> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the >> captured >> drone's systems inside Iran. >> >> Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off >> communications >> links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who >> works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently >> trying >> to unravel the drones stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could >> not >> be named for his safety. >> >> Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a >> technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the >> Iranian >> specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it >> land >> in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in >> Afghanistan. >> >> "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the >> Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's >> "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise >> [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This >> is >> where the bird loses its brain." >> >> The spoofing technique that the Iranians used which took into >> account >> precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data >> >> made the drone land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to >> crack the remote-control signals and communications from the US control >> center, says the engineer. >> >> The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US, >> Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an >> ever-widening >> covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear >> scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and >> the >> Stuxnet computer virus that set back Irans nuclear program. >> >> Now this engineers account of how Iran took over one of Americas most >> sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The >> techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less >> sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the >> engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS >> signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites. >> Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in >> Iraq< >> http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month >> > >> >> Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS >> spoofing >> indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is >> plausible. >> >> "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible to manipulation, >> says >> former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding >> that >> it is certainly possible to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it >> flies on a different course. I wouldn't say it's easy, but the >> technology >> is there. >> >> In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have >> downloaded >> live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with >> inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Irans apparent ability now to >> actually take control of a drone is far more significant. >> >> Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted >> over >> its nuclear program. >> >> Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air >> defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), >> described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided >> missile a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone. >> >> *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the >> 'beast'*< >> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast >> > >> >> We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning >> deception of the aggressive systems, said Gholizadeh, such that we >> can >> define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile >> would >> change to our desired destination. >> >> Gholizadeh said that all the movements of these [enemy drones] were >> being >> watched, and obstructing their work was always on our agenda. >> >> That interview has since been pulled from Fars Persian-language >> website. >> And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack, >> which some Iranian news sites called suspicious suggesting the >> electronic >> warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran. >> >> *Iran's growing electronic capabilities >> *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to >> be >> "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code." >> >> Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US >> will >> "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence >> of >> any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such >> surveillance, >> now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones. >> >> US officials skeptical of Irans capabilities blame a malfunction, but >> so >> far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American >> analyst >> ridiculed Irans capability, telling Defense News that the loss was >> like >> dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture. >> >> A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There >> are >> a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan." >> >> Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and >> other >> advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem >> like a dream for us but it could be amazing for others, deputy IRGC >> commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week. >> Iran: Obama should apologize for drone >> 'spying'< >> http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation >> > >> >> According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western >> intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took >> place >> sometime in the past two years, when it managed to blind a CIA spy >> satellite by aiming a laser burst quite accurately. >> >> More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says >> the >> engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were >> made >> accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial >> evidence" >> pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on >> users. >> >> Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more >> difficult, asserts the engineer. >> >> *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability >> *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone >> countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of >> vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the >> Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s. >> Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all >> drone >> data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan after finding militant >> laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq and acknowledged that >> they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily >> exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the >> modern >> military depends. >> "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by >> poorly >> controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and >> MP3 >> players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a >> professor >> from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial >> Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in >> Australia. >> >> "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and >> civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked >> out >> how they can jam GPS," he says. >> >> *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control >> future*< >> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future >> > >> >> The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to >> the >> GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian >> purposes. In 2003, a Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos >> National >> Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were >> easily >> overwhelmed with a stronger local signal. >> >> A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS >> signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time >> that >> it is not, reads the Los Alamos report. In a sophisticated spoofing >> attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving >> targets true position and then gradually walk the target to a false >> position. >> >> The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago >> communications security conference in October laid out parameters for >> successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a >> "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets. >> >> To better cope with hostile electronic attacks, the US Air Force in >> late >> September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation >> warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to >> the >> Defense Update website. >> >> Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization >> program" >> for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the >> military >> GPS service, making it more robust." >> >> *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged >> *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer, >> and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 the same year that >> the >> RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then >> state-of-the-art surveillance systems. >> In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth) >> drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones >> including one that had been watching over the underground uranium >> enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom. >> >> In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside >> northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two >> years >> of close observation. >> >> Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the >> left >> wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American >> banners. >> >> The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we >> made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same >> altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few >> meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in >> landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage." >> >> Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, >> Irans >> electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown and often >> dismissed. >> >> "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. >> "Have >> you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied >> many-fold." >> When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware >> it >> might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could >> not >> stay away." >> >> ** **Scott Peterson* <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson >> >*, >> the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an >> Iranian >> journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot >> be >> further identified for security reasons. >> * >> >> *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor* >> >> < >> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/# >> > >> >> >> Best, >> >> -John >> =============== >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> time-nuts mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe, go to >> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts >> and follow the instructions there. >> > _______________________________________________ time-nuts mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
