I'm not sure that what is claimed is a subjective re-living (presumably a kind 
of current experience invoking emotion which may, or may not, be stored with 
the memory), but just that the same cells that were active in encoding are 
active in recall--but that needn't imply a subjective re-living, just 
remembering: Something long held to be true.
 
I would imagine, from a basic point of view, that repeated re-remberings would 
serve to strengthen the particular memory since the cells most active during 
origninal encoding would be reactivated with each re-remembering and thus their 
associative firing would be strengthened. However, each cell in that particular 
memory also has to code for many others depending upon the activation pattern 
of the area, and given that most memories are not "intense" and not a 
blow-by-blow recording, therein lies the opportunity to introduce new details 
(false or otherwise) which become stored with the memory for subsequent recall 
(where else would it be stored?). Over time, then, the memory becomes modified 
as we blur the (usually non-important) distinction between what we were told 
about the event and what actually happened.
 
I'm not sure where I read it, but the brain may have a "tag" stored with the 
memory indicating whether an event happened to us, or it didn't--in which case 
that tag would presumably be more and more mis-applied to other info (or it 
becomes weaker with each re-remembering because each re-remembering we know is 
not currently happening) if the event was a personal experience. Anybody have 
an idea about that?

I would assume that leaves us at exactly: "More experiments?"
 
--Mike
--- On Sat, 9/6/08, Allen Esterson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

From: Allen Esterson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [tips] For the Brain, Remembering Is Like Reliving - NYTimes.com
To: "Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS)" <[email protected]>
Date: Saturday, September 6, 2008, 1:23 AM

A second thought on my previous posting on "Remembering is like
reliving":
>Should this be "remembering of a certain kind is like reliving"? 
>I'm thinking of recollections of distant events that are actually 
>the result of remembering a whole series of rememberings over 
>time, and possibly (such as in the case of childhood memories) 
>includes material that other people have supplied in the past. 
>Would these be registered as "relivings" in the same way? 
>I have my doubts.

I think there is good evidence that false memories can be experienced
subjectively like reliving an event (though this may be a result of going
over and over the 'event', as in psychotherapy). So where does that
leave
us? More experiments?

Allen Esterson
Former lecturer, Science Department
Southwark College, London
http://www.esterson.org

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