Buddy Grah wrote:
> I think Paul's example of "thinking aloud" protocols is a good example
> of an introspective technique being used in mainstream cognition.
> Now my question is: To what _extent_ are introspective
> techniques being used in mainstream cognition and is if fair to
characterize
> mainstream cognition as a movement that relies on introspection as _its
> method_?
> While we might find good examples of introspective techniques such as
> Paul's, it seems to me that mainstream cognition relies more heavily
> on other methods.
Absolutely. I can't imagine that introspective techniques make up more than
a little sliver in the universe of methods used in cognitive research. If
Schultz and Schultz actually claim that cognition is about introspective
methods, I'd say they made a bad assumption, and didn't look carefully
enough at the field.
> Since mental imagery was brought up, let me use it as an example.
> Our understanding that mental imagery has consequences for behavior
> has largely been been inferred from research using memory
> performance, response time, and brain activity. Rarely if ever is the
participant
> in the research asked about the phenomenal experience of the mental
> image. That, of course, doesn't mean that one could not ask
> about the phenomenal experience, it just doesn't seem to be done
(frequently).
Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, in "Consciousness Explained" (you
knew I was going to bring that up, didn't you?), Dennett argues partly
through introspection _against_ the "mental rotation" and "mental imagery"
conclusions usually drawn from the Shepard studies. This in the context of
making the same kinds of arguments that Nisbett and Wilson make (about
inaccessible contents of mental processes).
Paul Smith
Alverno College
Milwaukee
