Dear Tipsters,
Buddy Grah wrote:
> Now my question is: To what _extent_ are introspective techniques being
> used in mainstream cognition and is if fair to characterize mainstream
> cognition as a movement that relies on introspection as _its method_?
> While we might find good examples of introspective techniques such as
> Paul's, it seems to me that mainstream cognition relies more heavily
> on other methods.
Buddy is correct. Mainstream cognitive psychology does rely mainly on
objective methods in that it infers processes from task performance.
Insofar as verbal reports are behaviour, they can be used in the same
way. However, as I note below, they are sometimes given more status
than that.
> Our understanding that mental imagery has consequences for behavior
> has largely been been inferred from research using memory performance,
> response time, and brain activity. Rarely if ever is the participant
> in the research asked about the phenomenal experience of the mental
> image. That, of course, doesn't mean that one could not ask about the
> phenomenal experience, it just doesn't seem to be done (frequently).
Again, Buddy is right that imagery is phenomenal experience is not
often emphasized. However, I think that it is fair to point out that
since mental imagery resurfaced as a topic along with cognitive
psychology in the 1970s, there have been two approaches: what might
be called "objective" and "subjective". The objective approach is
advocated and practiced by researchers like Paivio (memory task
performance) and Kosslyn (reaction time to mental scanning) whi infer
processes from behaviour. The subjective approach is represented by
people such as Marks and Richardson, who have studied imagery as an
experience via questionnaires in which people verbally report on
their mental experience (e.g., imagery vividness). Objective task
perofrmance is then related to individual differences in subjective
imagery.
The distinction between these two approaches may not be as great as
it seems. For example, Richardson argues that Paivio's stimulus
materials, which are experimentally manipulated on variables such as
concreteness and imagery (I), have been previously subjectively rated
to obtain information about these variables. Similarly,
imagery-as-process may be inferred from relationships between
questionnaire responses and task performance. Nevertheless, the
subjective approach does grant official status to
imagery-as-experience. As I mentioned in a previous post, if
variations in experience can be related to behaviour, features of
consciousness may be conceived of as part of the causal process.
References
Denis, M., & Kosslyn, S. M. (in press). Scanning visual mental
images: A window on the mind. Cahiers de Psychologie
Cognitive/Current Psychology of Cognition.
Marks, D.F. (1973). Visual imagery differences in the recall of
pictures. British Journal of Psychology, 64, 17-24.
McKelvie, S. J. (in press). Metric properties of visual images: Only
a partial window on the mind. Cahiers de Psychologie
Cognitive/Current Psychology of Cognition.
Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery and verbal processes. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston.
Richardson, A. (1994). Individual differences in
imaging: Their measurement, origins, and consequences. Amityville,
NY: Baywood.
___________________________________________________
Stuart J. McKelvie, Ph.D., Phone: (819)822-9600
Department of Psychology, Extension 2402
Bishop's University, Fax: (819)822-9661
Lennoxville, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Quebec J1M 1Z7,
Canada.
Bishop's University Psychology Department Web Page:
http://www.ubishops.ca/ccc/div/soc/psy
___________________________________________________
