On Mon, 02 May 2016 11:36:09 -0700, Christopher Green wrote:
To sort this all out I think you need to distinguish among various potential meanings of "unconscious".
With all due respect, I think such an activity is pointless. In the context of Freudian theory, although such distinctions *might* turn out to be useful, I don't think anyone takes Freudian theory seriously as a modern cognitive theory (though perhaps some with a hermeneutic bent such as Larry Marks might beg to differ). For Marks' perspective on Freud in relation to Fechner, see: https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=t_JskTNCkNYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA23&dq=%22Was+Fechner+an+eminent+psychologist%3F%22&ots=HnZzhAIOhV&sig=gfanhe2QEhBSHEynyvV8hww0-SM#v=onepage&q=%22Was%20Fechner%20an%20eminent%20psychologist%3F%22&f=false or Marks, L. E. (2013). Freud and Fechner, desire and energy, hermeneutics and psychophysics. In Geissler, Link, and Townsend (Eds). Cognition, Information Processing, and Psychophysics: Basic Issues. (pp23-42) Psychology Press. But Marks make clear that the connection between Freud and Fechner is at level of Fechner's "inner psychophysics", most of the writings on which have not been translated into English. The key point is that level of consciousness play less of role then other Fechnerian ideas. For more on Fechner and Freud, see: Ellenberger, H. F. (1956). Fechner and Freud. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 20(4), 201. Scheerer, E. (1987). The unknown Fechner. Psychological Research, 49(4), 197-202. The Scheerer article reviews the "inner psychophysics" and this issue also has an English translation of Fechner's writing on the topic; see: Fechner, G. T. (1987). Outline of a new principle of mathematical psychology (1851). Psychological research, 49(4), 203-207. [snip]
I am no Herbart expert, to be sure, but my understanding is that the portion of the apperceptive mass not currently in consciousness was thought to be, in Freud's terms, preconscious. It could normally be retrieved easily if needed.
I think it is a mistake to try to recast Herbartian theory into Freudian terms because, IMHO, the latter has little if no validity. I think that there are a number of aspects about Herbart's theory that represent severe limitations on its usefulness (e.g., it is heavily metaphysical, Herbart did no empirical work to derive or test his theory) but it does represent a first attempt to describe the "mind-soul" in mathematical terms (though Fechner would disagree and go about his own way). Useful references for Herbart's theory as it might apply today follow: Boudewijnse, G. J. A., Murray, D. J., & Bandomir, C. A. (1999). Herbart's mathematical psychology. History of Psychology, 2(3), 163. Boudewijnse, G. J. A., Murray, D. J., & Bandomir, C. A. (2001). The fate of Herbart's mathematical psychology. History of psychology, 4(2), 107. Murray, D. J., & Bandomir, C. A. (2001). Fechner's Inner Psychophysics Viewed from both a Herbartian and a Fechnerian Perspective. na. Access at: http://psychologie.biphaps.uni-leipzig.de/fechner/generalinfo/PDFs/DMurray.pdf
As for Fechner, if he used the iceberg metaphor, I think he used it for psychophysical situations in which the stimulus had simply not reached perceptual threshold. That is, it is simply not conscious; it is not unconscious in the sense of being retrievable to consciousness.
I think that Scheerer's work (cited above) on Fechner shows that there is still much to learn about his theories (e.g., the "inner psychophysics" that related sensation to brain activity). and statements about the operation of consciousness and the unconscious may be premature, given that English speakers know only of the English translation of the Elements and not of the numerous other papers that are still untranslated.
I'll be interested to hear your responses to this.
I suspect that you might actually be less interested than you let on. ;-)
I think that the iceberg metaphor of consciousness is a weak metaphor that focuses on a superficial aspect of its functioning (i.e., only a small amount of our stored knowledge is available to awareness at any one time). In discussions with the "Iceberg Hunters" we mentioned that an iceberg is a pretty dumb metaphor to use if one is using referring to a dynamic cognitive-affective system. So, in some respects, the question becomes trivial: who was the first one to make the lousy metaphor that the mind is like an iceberg? Deeper questions about consciousness take us into a dangerous terrain because we still don't really know how to talk about consciousness (I remember reading in agony at Sir John Eccles' attempt to distinguish between consciousness1, consciousness2, consciousness3.....; that way lies madness). Getting back to the original issue of "Zombie" scientific literature, the iceberg metaphor seems to be a clear example in psychology and the field would benefit from removing its from usage outside of placing it into historical context. -Mike Palij New York University [email protected] --- You are currently subscribed to tips as: [email protected]. To unsubscribe click here: http://fsulist.frostburg.edu/u?id=13090.68da6e6e5325aa33287ff385b70df5d5&n=T&l=tips&o=48658 or send a blank email to leave-48658-13090.68da6e6e5325aa33287ff385b70df...@fsulist.frostburg.edu
