> On Nov 30, 2016, at 11:36 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>
> Why is that whole thing even there in the first place? From the previous
> discussions where this came up, the pretty much universal consensus was that
> people were ignoring the requirement because it served no obvious purpose
> but broke interoperability. Unless you're a server operator that chooses to
> buy a whole bunch of $995 certs, one per algorithm, from a CA that allows
> you to choose which algorithm gets used for signing, the whole thing is
> completely inapplicable. You send whatever cert chain the CA gave you to
> the client, and it's up to them to decide whether they want to accept or
> reject. What would be lost by simply removing that entire block of text,
> since it's being ignored by implementers anyway? The solution is to remove
> it, not to fiddle with it until it becomes a no-op that matches what
> everyone is doing anyway.
I would agree, if indeed everyone were ignoring this. Sadly, that's not
the case. In particular try to send to use a CAcert-issued client cert
to send email with STARTTLS to outlook.com...
So I wanted to see explicit text saying that the server SHOULD send what
it has. Some folks here probably still think you and I (and perhaps ekr)
are wrong, and that the server should drop the connection... This is not
an invitation to reopen that wound.
--
Viktor.
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