On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 7:01 AM, Jayaraghavendran Kuppannan < [email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Eric, > > You had mentioned last time that if the scenario really warranted, we can > define new cipher suites for this rather than defining a new extension. Do > you still think it would be a good idea for us to propose a draft on the > same? > No. I think you should move to TLS 1.3 unless it's highly urgent. -Ekr > > Thanks! > > Regards, > Jay > > On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 7:05 PM, Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Andreas, >> >> DTLS 1.3 will behave this way by default, so it would be better to just >> move to 1.3 rather than patching 1.2. >> >> -Ekr >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 5:32 AM, Andreas Walz < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I stumbled upon an expired draft introducing a new (D)TLS extension to >>> omit explicit nonces in (D)TLS AEAD cipher modes >>> (draft-jay-tls-omit-aead-explicit-nonce-extension). For a number of >>> cipher suites, this would allow to reduce the per-record overhead in (D)TLS >>> by 8 bytes. >>> >>> Is there any interest in breathing new life into that draft? In our >>> scenario (DTLS for a legacy industrial wireless communication system) every >>> single byte counts. That is why we would strongly support reviving this >>> draft... >>> >>> Thanks and Cheers, >>> Andi Walz >>> >>> >>> ___________________________________ >>> >>> Andreas Walz >>> Research Engineer >>> Institute of reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics >>> (ivESK) >>> Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> >
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