If this is indeed about adding [goo], what prevents Viktor or Paul from proposing a new addition to the protocol in the form of a new I-D that enacts the changes they wish to see?
On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 7:41 AM, Melinda Shore <[email protected]> wrote: > On 4/12/18 9:54 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: >> I'm waiting to see if anything else comes out of this thread. >> In particular, I am hoping that some authors/proponents of leaving the >> document in the RFC Editor queue would speak to the question of the >> target scope, given the arguments that have been presented regarding >> the risk/reward tradeoff of the current narrow scope. > > I'm also waiting to see if something new comes up in the > discussion, but it seems at this point we're just rehashing > previous discussion and nothing much is changing. In > particular, no new information is being contributed. > > The one thing that could change my mind about this would be > if there was an intent to actually attack the problem described > in the changed scope (well, also if the proposed change could - > in fact - lead to the deprecation of the web PKI, but the chance > of that seems vanishingly small). Absent that I really don't > like adding goo to protocols on the off chance that at some > unforeseeable point in the future there's a possibility that > someone might actually want to use that feature. I think we've > got other ways of handling that eventuality and very little > assurance that it will ever happen, anyway. > > Melinda > > > -- > Software longa, hardware brevis > > PGP fingerprint: 4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2 > 34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
