Dan Brown <danibr...@blackberry.com> wrote: > ANSI X9.62-2005 was withdrawn in 2015
Ok, that TLS 1.3 is relying on a withdrawn publication that used to be behind a
paywall is even worse.
> Also, I expect FIPS 186-5 is nearly ready, and will specify much of ECDSA
That NIST FIPS 186-5 will include all the details needed to implement ECDSA is
great.
>IETF has specs for sigs and their formats already, no?
At the time when RFC 8446 was published, there was probably no quick and easy
solution to the problem. But the fact that IETF has historically been fine with
relying on specifications behind paywalls is part of the problem. If IETF had
implemented a strong open-access policy a long-time ago, there would probably
be an open-access version of ECDSA (NIST or IETF) a long time ago..
Cheers,
John
-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Brown <danibr...@blackberry.com>
Date: Tuesday, 1 October 2019 at 12:47
To: John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com>, Peter Gutmann
<pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com>, "TLS@ietf.org"
<TLS@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for erratum?
Re ECDSA specs and paywells:
ANSI X9.62-2005 was withdrawn in 2015, expiring automatically after 10
years, despite my weak effort.
A revival, ANSI X9.142, with almost the same content is under way, though
even its fate is unsure.
Also, I expect FIPS 186-5 is nearly ready, and will specify much of ECDSA
and EdDSA (not ASN.1?), which many may like (even better than ANSI).
Meanwhile, SEC1, versions 1.0 and 2.0, are available, fortunately or not,
despite my weak effort.
IETF has specs for sigs and their formats already, no?
Then there's ISO, IEEE, ...
Original Message
From: John Mattsson
Sent: Tuesday, October 1, 2019 5:25 AM
To: Peter Gutmann; Hubert Kario; TLS@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Ecdsa-sig-value in TLS 1.3 – need for erratum?
Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote:
> Now, I don't have access to X9.62-2005, but there's a possibility of
confusion.
I think references to specifications behind paywalls and other types of
limited access is a major problem. Not only for the standardization process,
but also for researchers and implementors. In general, I think people should be
able to implement and analyze IETF standards without having to pay for access.
Open-access is even more important for security specifications. ANSI X.62
is hopefully quite well-studied, but for other references, the lack of analysis
often leads to mistakes and unknown weaknesses.
I would like the IETF to take a much stronger stance against normative
references to paywalls.
Cheers,
John
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