At first glance, hasn’t sufficient analysis been done in:
[VERIFIED-BINDINGS]
Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and A. Pironti,
"Verified Contributive Channel Bindings for Compound
Authentication", Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS), 2015.? Just a thought? Michael Ross NIWC Atlantic US Navy From: TLS <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Sam Whited Sent: Sunday, October 3, 2021 9:37 AM To: Salz, Rich <[email protected]>; Rob Sayre <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: [TLS] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-09.txt> (Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3) to Proposed Standard I'd be okay with that provided we can release an update if such an analysis is ever done? Although this is such a low-stakes issue that I worry that the prejudicial value of such a statement far outweighs the security value. I don't feel strongly about it though. —Sam On October 3, 2021 1:06:40 PM UTC, "Salz, Rich" <[email protected]> wrote: Perhaps adding text that says no security analysis has been done.
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
