On 03/07/2025 14:51, Yaakov Stein wrote:
Stephen,

ECH is not yet another confidentiality feature.

We disagree.

TLS already provides perfectly good user content confidentiality.

The IETF reached consensus on the desirability of this back in
2020 via RFC8744.

ECH is more akin to DNS tunneling or phishing based on domain names that look 
correct.

Phishing? That's quite the stretch - so much so I think it quite
breaks your argument;-)

It is yet another method of hiding malicious traffic.

ECH and TLS has nothing to say about whether traffic is good or
bad.

As I said, I think this is just regurgitating old arguments, so I
don't plan to continue arguing, unless/until I see something new,
which (other than a claim that ECH==phishing;-), I've not.

Cheers,
S.



Y(J)S

-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie>
Sent: Thursday, July 3, 2025 4:24 PM
To: Yaakov Stein <yst...@allot.com>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] FW: New Version Notification for 
draft-stein-tls-ech-considered-harmful-00.txt


Hiya,

On 02/07/2025 15:43, Yaakov Stein wrote:
Just in case anyone missed this ...

I see nothing new or noteworthy in the text. It's the same set of arguments 
emitted whenever there's the prospect that some new protocol confidentiality 
feature looks like it may get to be widely deployed.

It mostly reminds me of a meeting I was at where (mobile) telcos
(loudly:-) predicted the sky would fall because youtube had turned on https. 
The sky didn't fall.

Cheers,
S.

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