A caveat makes no real difference to me either. We might add the same sort of caveats to any of the multitude of codepoint registration drafts that we *don't* adopt. But we instead choose not to adopt them, especially when they have limited applicability.
On Mon, Jul 14, 2025, at 23:05, Sean Turner wrote: > We kicked off an adoption call for Use of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3; see [0]. > We called consensus [1], and that decision was appealed. We have > reviewed the messages and agree that we need to redo the adoption call > to get more input. > > What appears to be the most common concern, which we will take from > Panos' email, is that "SLH-DSA sigs are too large and slow for general > use in TLS 1.3 applications". One way to address this concern is to add > an applicablity statement to address this point. We would like to > propose that this (or something close to this) be added to the I-D: > > Applications that use SLH-DSA need to be aware that the signatures > sizes are large; the signature sizes for the cipher suites specified > herein range from 7,856 to 49,856 bytes. Likewise, the cipher suites > are considered slow. While these costs might be amoritized over the > cost of a long lived connection, the cipher suites specified herein are > not considered for general use in TLS 1.3. > > With this addition in mind, we would like to start another WG adoption > call for draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa. If you support adoption with the above > text (or something similar) and are willing to review and contribute > text, please send a message to the list. If you do not support adoption > of this draft with the above text (or something similar), please send a > message to the list and indicate why. This call will close at 2359 UTC > on 28 July 2025. > > Cheers, > Deirdre, Joe, and Sean > > [0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/o4KnXjI-OpuHPcB33e8e78rACb0/ > [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hhLtBBctK5em6l82m7rgM6_hefo/ > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa/ > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org