I concur. I actually had thought we had agreed that the current text shouldn't appear and then there was some attempt to converge on a replacement, but that didn't really work out, so we should just delete it and move forward.
-Ekr On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 10:24 AM Christopher Patton <[email protected]> wrote: > I'm also in favor of simply deleting the text. > > Chris P. > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2025, 10:19 David Benjamin <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I also agree we should simply delete the text. >> >> It is irrelevant for ML-KEM. While the text says "if other algorithms are >> used", if we ever do consider an algorithm where this matters, we can >> always debate it then, with full context, and put it in *that* document, >> where it would be more likely to be read by implementers anyway. >> >> PS: The formatting in that section is slightly odd. Should "Larger public >> keys and/or ciphertexts", "Duplication of key shares", and "Failures" (but >> delete that one) be subsections? >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 5:49 AM Filippo Valsorda <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> 2025-10-28 05:29 GMT+01:00 Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>: >>> >>> > >> I think there is consensus that there is no advise to give to >>> implementers >>> > >> to handle these failure cases. While we could use that to justify >>> saying >>> > >> nothing, my own preference is to at least have a sentence >>> explicitely >>> > >> saying that implementers should do nothing, in case implementers >>> become >>> > >> aware of these theortical failures and wrongly assume the >>> specification >>> > >> was not aware and thus "vulnerable" to these issues. >>> > >> >>> > >> Perhaps: >>> > >> >>> > >> Current: >>> > >> Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM >>> > >> [NIST-FIPS-203], have non-zero probability of failure, meaning >>> two >>> > >> honest parties may derive different shared secrets. This would >>> cause a >>> > >> handshake failure. ML-KEM has a cryptographically small failure >>> rate; if >>> > >> other algorithms are used, implementers should be aware of the >>> potential >>> > >> of handshake failure. Clients MAY retry if a failure is >>> encountered. >>> > >> >>> > >> New: >>> > >> Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM >>> > >> [NIST-FIPS-203], have non-zero probability of failure, meaning >>> > >> two honest parties may derive different shared secrets. This >>> > >> would cause a handshake failure. As with other similar failures >>> > >> (such as bit corruptions), Clients MAY retry if a failure is >>> > >> encountered. Due to the negliable rate of occurances of these >>> > >> failure events, the lack of a known feasable method and the >>> > >> additional risk of introducing new attack vectors when >>> attempting >>> > >> to handle these events, it is RECOMMENDED for implementers to >>> > >> not specifically handle post-quantum key exchange shared secrets >>> > >> failures, and rely on the pre-existing code paths that handle >>> > >> derivation failures. >>> >>> It was my impression that there was rough consensus to drop the original >>> text and say nothing instead, though the "New" text above is instead an >>> acceptable overly-elaborate way of saying "nothing to see here, move >>> along". >>> >>> >>> Yeah, it looks to me like there is no consensus on the original text, in >>> fact. Different people have different opinions on what to replace it with, >>> but that doesn't mean there is consensus on the original. I think the bar >>> to ship some text is WG consensus, not lack of consensus on alternatives. >>> Does anyone actually support shipping the original text? >>> >>> Were there any strong objections to saying nothing? All I could see were >>> "we could say nothing, or we could say [text]" which implies support for >>> saying nothing, as well. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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