I also think simply deleting the text is the way to go.
On October 28, 2025 6:38:55 PM GMT, Bas Westerbaan <[email protected]> wrote: >I concur. > >On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 6:48 PM Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I concur. I actually had thought we had agreed that the current text >> shouldn't appear and then there was some attempt to converge on a >> replacement, but that >> didn't really work out, so we should just delete it and move forward. >> >> -Ekr >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 10:24 AM Christopher Patton <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> I'm also in favor of simply deleting the text. >>> >>> Chris P. >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025, 10:19 David Benjamin <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> I also agree we should simply delete the text. >>>> >>>> It is irrelevant for ML-KEM. While the text says "if other algorithms >>>> are used", if we ever do consider an algorithm where this matters, we can >>>> always debate it then, with full context, and put it in *that* document, >>>> where it would be more likely to be read by implementers anyway. >>>> >>>> PS: The formatting in that section is slightly odd. Should "Larger >>>> public keys and/or ciphertexts", "Duplication of key shares", and >>>> "Failures" (but delete that one) be subsections? >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 5:49 AM Filippo Valsorda <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> 2025-10-28 05:29 GMT+01:00 Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>: >>>>> >>>>> > >> I think there is consensus that there is no advise to give to >>>>> implementers >>>>> > >> to handle these failure cases. While we could use that to justify >>>>> saying >>>>> > >> nothing, my own preference is to at least have a sentence >>>>> explicitely >>>>> > >> saying that implementers should do nothing, in case implementers >>>>> become >>>>> > >> aware of these theortical failures and wrongly assume the >>>>> specification >>>>> > >> was not aware and thus "vulnerable" to these issues. >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> Perhaps: >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> Current: >>>>> > >> Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM >>>>> > >> [NIST-FIPS-203], have non-zero probability of failure, meaning >>>>> two >>>>> > >> honest parties may derive different shared secrets. This would >>>>> cause a >>>>> > >> handshake failure. ML-KEM has a cryptographically small >>>>> failure rate; if >>>>> > >> other algorithms are used, implementers should be aware of the >>>>> potential >>>>> > >> of handshake failure. Clients MAY retry if a failure is >>>>> encountered. >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> New: >>>>> > >> Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM >>>>> > >> [NIST-FIPS-203], have non-zero probability of failure, meaning >>>>> > >> two honest parties may derive different shared secrets. This >>>>> > >> would cause a handshake failure. As with other similar failures >>>>> > >> (such as bit corruptions), Clients MAY retry if a failure is >>>>> > >> encountered. Due to the negliable rate of occurances of these >>>>> > >> failure events, the lack of a known feasable method and the >>>>> > >> additional risk of introducing new attack vectors when >>>>> attempting >>>>> > >> to handle these events, it is RECOMMENDED for implementers to >>>>> > >> not specifically handle post-quantum key exchange shared >>>>> secrets >>>>> > >> failures, and rely on the pre-existing code paths that handle >>>>> > >> derivation failures. >>>>> >>>>> It was my impression that there was rough consensus to drop the original >>>>> text and say nothing instead, though the "New" text above is instead an >>>>> acceptable overly-elaborate way of saying "nothing to see here, move >>>>> along". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yeah, it looks to me like there is no consensus on the original text, >>>>> in fact. Different people have different opinions on what to replace it >>>>> with, but that doesn't mean there is consensus on the original. I think >>>>> the >>>>> bar to ship some text is WG consensus, not lack of consensus on >>>>> alternatives. Does anyone actually support shipping the original text? >>>>> >>>>> Were there any strong objections to saying nothing? All I could see >>>>> were "we could say nothing, or we could say [text]" which implies support >>>>> for saying nothing, as well. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>>>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>
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