On 26.01.26 21:07, Eric Rescorla wrote:
On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 11:55 AM Muhammad Usama Sardar <[email protected]> wrote:On 26.01.26 19:36, Eric Rescorla wrote:Regardless, the argument cannot be "use the webpki because it offers better privacy features" because for players in this space, non-webpki authentication and authorization is more important than a privacy feature that defends only against passive attacks. I think you are perhaps misunderstanding my comment, because I'm not talking about the WebPKI at all in this discussion. I'm instead saying that the client should send the DNSSEC chain in a TLS extension rather than having the server query for it, thus avoiding revealing its identity on the wire. This is entirely isomorphic to the current identity structure.Do I understand correctly that you are proposing the DNSSEC chain to be put as an extension of client's Certificate message of TLS 1.3? Yes.
Thanks a lot for clarification. I completely agree with you and now I am very confused why there is pushback on this proposal. Extensions of Certificate message are already supported in TLS 1.3 and has the advantage of encrypting it using client_write_key for initial handshake, thus preventing the privacy concerns. I haven't seen argument for why this proposal is problematic. Maybe I am missing something.
TLS 1.2 is frozen; the draft has to move to TLS 1.3 anyway.I am also lost why this was mentioned as a charter discussion. In my reading of DANCE charter [0], your proposal is not at all prohibited. In fact, coordination with TLS WG was supposed to happen. In particular, charter says:
> DANCE will define how DNS DANE records will represent client identities for TLS connections.
> DANCE will coordinate with the TLS working group to define any TLS protocol updates required to support client authentication using DANE.
Unfortunately, the coordination has not happened, otherwise this would have been resolved much earlier.
-Usama [0] https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dance/about/
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