Clearly, this does not constitute an ad hominem attack. I have not even mentioned any individual by name. An argumentum ad hominem seeks to divert attention from the substance of an argument by attacking the person making it. Here, however, the two individuals in question have not presented any substantive argument at all. They merely cast a vote, accompanied by messages consisting of only three and four words, respectively, in a manner that appears to align with the strategic interests of their organization. A brief review of the mailing-list archives further shows that neither individual has ever participated in a substantive discussion; the only previous message from either of them was likewise just a vote consisting of eight words [1].
Declaring conflicts of interest is a fundamental principle of good scientific practice, intended precisely to identify and mitigate such conflicts. The publicly available evidence indicates that the NSA is an military intelligence agency whose activities include systematic efforts to undermine cryptographic security. From a scientific standpoint, this would require NSA employees not only to disclose their affiliation, but also to declare a conflict of interest when participating in discussions of this nature, since they are employed (and paid) to advance the agency's objectives, which are in an obvious conflict of interest with the goals of this mailing list. My point is that current IETF procedures appear to have a shortcoming in this regard. This issue becomes even more significant when, at the same time, leading researchers such as Daniel J. Bernstein, who demonstrably acts in alignment with the objectives of this mailing list, are (partially or fully) blocked from participation as described previously. Kind regards, Ken Kubota ____________________________________________________ Ken Kubota https://doi.org/10.4444/100 [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/dlMtkGDzXfG0EhCGZn9nwjv_1FM/ > Am 07.07.2026 um 08:48 schrieb Andrew Campling > <[email protected]>: > > I believe the final paragraph of the email below breaches the IETF code of > conduct, specifically: > > "Regardless of these individual differences, participants treat their > colleagues with respect as persons especially when it is difficult to agree > with them: treat other participants as you would like to be treated." > > "IETF participants have impersonal discussions. We dispute ideas by > using reasoned argument rather than through intimidation or personal attack." > > Use of an ad hominem attack undermines rational discussion and fails to > provide logical reasoning. > > Andrew > >> On 7 Jul 2026, at 05:52, Ken Kubota <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> I object to the proposal to publish draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-*. >> >> Replacing a hybrid (double-encryption) mechanism with a non-hybrid >> (single-encryption) mechanism introduces significant and obvious risks >> without providing any corresponding benefits. >> >> Given that, during the recent NIST PQC standardization process, even one of >> the finalists dropped out, removing a safety belt and relying exclusively on >> a relatively new algorithm not only jeopardizes cryptographic security but >> also appears irresponsible. >> OpenSSH reached the appropriate conclusion by adopting a hybrid approach [1]. >> >> With regard to the process itself, genuine consensus (including a "rough >> consensus") cannot be achieved under conditions of censorship [2]. >> >> I find it astonishing that Daniel J. Bernstein, a cryptographer, whose >> algorithms run half of the internet or more and who has an outstanding track >> record of pushing back against attempts to weaken cryptography, has received >> no response for nearly two months (14 Jun 2025 to 13 Aug 2025), even after >> providing, as requested, a permanent link [3]. >> >> By contrast, when two NSA employees openly support an approach [4] that >> clearly reduces or potentially compromises cryptographic security, the >> obvious conflict of interest raises the broader question of whether IETF >> procedures should be reviewed. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Ken Kubota >> >> ____________________________________________________ >> >> Ken Kubota >> https://doi.org/10.4444/100 >> >> >> >> [1] "New features >> ------------ >> >> * ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key >> exchange method by default ("[email protected]"). >> The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future >> quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange >> (the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in >> NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination >> ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security >> as the status quo. >> >> We are making this change now (i.e. ahead of cryptographically- >> relevant quantum computers) to prevent "capture now, decrypt >> later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH >> session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently >> advanced quantum computer is available." >> https://www.openssh.org/txt/release-9.0 >> >> [2] "Consensus decision making >> The general rule on how Working Groups make decisions is that the Working >> Group has to come to "rough consensus", meaning that a very large majority >> of those who care must agree, and that those in the minority have had a >> chance to explain why and their points have been addressed, even if they >> were not agreed with." >> https://www.ietf.org/process/wgs/#consensus >> >> [3] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/X8-3pmioGxFZX3T0tRsdxPWKx3I/ >> >> [4] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/XIckyKVIEgKNus-koXOLooFpU54/ >> and https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ZX2lWkx4FApNZ8q787wIEpn7USg/ > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
