On 28 May 2013 14:51, adrelanos <[email protected]> wrote: > How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside? > > Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide > communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed > with a fairly good results. > > Tor isn't a website, but if SSH leaks which website has been visited > even when using a SSH tunnel, will it also leak the fact, that someone > is using Tor through a SSH tunnel?
I think that if we make the adversary upgrade from probing and byte matching (e.g. look for specific ciphersuites) to statistical protocol modeling, especially with a small time investment on our part, we have won a battle. Development effort isn't free. You probably can detect Tor traffic inside of SSH with some probability X after some amount of traffic Y. But what X, what Y, and how much effort on behalf of the adversary will it take? I don't know, but I do think we should work to move the fight beyond something as simple as byte matching. -tom
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