Tom Ritter: > On 28 May 2013 14:51, adrelanos <[email protected]> wrote: > >> How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside? >> >> Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide >> communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed >> with a fairly good results. >> >> Tor isn't a website, but if SSH leaks which website has been visited >> even when using a SSH tunnel, will it also leak the fact, that someone >> is using Tor through a SSH tunnel? > > > I think that if we make the adversary upgrade from probing and byte > matching (e.g. look for specific ciphersuites) to statistical protocol > modeling, especially with a small time investment on our part, we have won > a battle. Development effort isn't free. > > You probably can detect Tor traffic inside of SSH with some probability X > after some amount of traffic Y. But what X, what Y, and how much effort on > behalf of the adversary will it take? I don't know, but I do think we > should work to move the fight beyond something as simple as byte matching.
Yes. Don't let me put off this idea. It was just a wild guess. Most likely an ssh transport will always work for a few people and that already an improvements. The more pluggable transports, the better. Maybe if there are enough transports, the other side just gives up. _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
