Am 09.03.2015 um 22:53 schrieb Markus Hitter: > It certainly wasn't meant this way. The point of these considerations is: of > what use is an anonymous network if virtually no website accepts connections > from it? Right: it's of not much use, with most of the public internet > blocked you can communicate inside the network, only. > > To take your webmail example: if the site admin decides there's too much spam > coming from Tor connections and blocks the entire network, then you're done > with your webmailing, even with full freedom inside Tor its self.
So wouldn't the correct solution also be to educate the administrators of such services? I mean the only reason, why there is more Tor-Exit-IPs in the abuse log than any other single unique IP is that there is tens of thousand of users using each Tor-Exit. I had such a case some days ago on an exit relay, someone with an Google account complained that there where abusive logins from the Tor Exits IP, so what should I do then? Block the whole login page domain of Google in my exit? Surely that is not the right solution if there is a few thousand users not trying to brute force that one account. I didn't even get any more reply from the Google user when I asked if this was only a single event or if it was multiple repeated. > > As such the only solution can be to play nice with public sites. I don't mean > to have all answers to all problems here. Opening only selected ports, a > common practice, could also be seen as censoring, still it's generally > considered to be acceptable. Apparently it's not enough to gain a good > reputation. Sure, but always answer to the abuse emails and try to explain, if you receive a few a week then prepare some text modules that you just copy an paste, make it look unique and many people will understand. Yours, yl _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
