> >I think it would be interesting see as to whether allowing bridges to have >dynamic IPs (or even encouraging it) would make them harder to block, and >would make it really easy for people >to contribute to the network in this >small way? Or at least, having a mostly dynamic IP - some devices change their >IP address more frequently than others, if my understanding is correct?> > >Duncan
I have heard this theory before and I do not believe it is correct. The dynamic IPs do not change every hour, it usually takes many days or even weeks. So the contribution of IPs being randomly changed to the difficulty of their enumeration by censors would be marginal at best. This COULD be useful if DirAuths would (a) stop punishing relays behind dynamic IPs (b) start campaigning and encouraging people with dynamic IPs and Raspis to run bridges and (c) raise the reputation of the bridges behind dynamic IPs according the novelty of their IP. So bridges with more recently changed IPs would get a higher priority in getting bridge traffic. Combined with intelligent assignment of either obfs4 or meek this would screw the Chinese (and soon the Russian) censors over big time, because they would be chasing an elusive army of Raspis with ever changing IPs... Counter-attacks and counter-counter-measures should be studied though, as adversaries could respond by establishing hundreds of rogue bridges with dynamically changing IPs... Rana _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
