Hi Jonathan, Jonathan D. Proulx: > On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 02:36:00PM +0000, Duncan wrote: > :Hi Jonathan, > : > :Jonathan Proulx: > :> > :> To the initial question for a honest operator who's open about their > :> ownership and enters proper family membership data I can't see how > :> more exit volume is a problem. TOR needs to be resilient against > :> malicious operators who don't disclose, nto sure what the current > :> value of "global" is but I should hope it's well above 5%... > :> > : > :Firstly, it's Tor not "TOR"! :) > > Tru but I type bad. :) > > :I'm curious about what you mean by "global" here, and how it relates to > :[potentially] malicious operators (suspicious relays of which are > :frequently thrown off the Tor network). > > "global" as in a global passive adversary, though I suppose running > nodes is an active adversary.
If that's what you mean, can you clarify what you meant by "I should hope it's well above 5%"? If an adversary is a global passive adversary, surely that would mean that they are for all intents and purposes seeing pretty much all of the traffic? I think it is worth remembering that there isn't evidence there is a global passive adversary at the moment, even if certain agencies and organizations clearly aspire to be one. > > main point, for well behaved servers that are labled and abviously > part of the same administrative domain clients won't use two of them > for any circuit, so where's the harm? Not rehtorical there it woudl be > at soem fraction of the network (as I say hopefully well abouve 5%), > if there is have could someone smarter than me say where it is? > > -Jon Best, Duncan _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
