On 6/26/18 10:29, Nagaev Boris wrote: > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Matt Traudt <[email protected]> wrote: >> On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote: >>> I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the >>> source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it >>> work's fine(slowly, but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its >>> still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the >>> Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site >>> or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected >>> from users who are using 1 hop? >>> >> >> Yes. >> >> Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves >> to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion >> service circuits too. >> >> If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor. >> >> Matt >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > How does a relay know if there is another relay in the circuit? What > if the attacker runs a "relay" locally? >
The way a client connects to a relay and the way a relay connects to another relay is different. Technically the attacker/user could run a relay/bridge locally and connect to that before the remote relay, creating a 2-hop circuit that **might** have performance similar to a 1-hop circuit. Matt _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
