> On 27 Jun 2018, at 00:34, Matt Traudt <pas...@torproject.org> wrote: > >> On 6/26/18 10:29, Nagaev Boris wrote: >>> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Matt Traudt <pas...@torproject.org> wrote: >>>> On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote: >>>> I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the >>>> source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it >>>> work's fine(slowly, but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its >>>> still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the >>>> Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site >>>> or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected >>>> from users who are using 1 hop? >>>> >>> >>> Yes. >>> >>> Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves >>> to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion >>> service circuits too. >>> >>> If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor. >> >> How does a relay know if there is another relay in the circuit? What >> if the attacker runs a "relay" locally? >> > > The way a client connects to a relay and the way a relay connects to > another relay is different. > > Technically the attacker/user could run a relay/bridge locally and
A relay, not a bridge: bridges look like clients to relays. Also, relays that aren't in the consensus trigger the exit defence, and I think they trigger some of the DDoS defences as well. > connect to that before the remote relay, creating a 2-hop circuit that > **might** have performance similar to a 1-hop circuit. T _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays