Hi Fabio. What you're describing is a sybil attack. An attacker definitely *wouldn't* get a majority of the exit traffic for those destinations - clients weigh relay selection by heuristics reported by the bandwidth authorities. Those authorities take a long time to warm up to new relays, so it would take quite a bit of uptime before they'd start seeing a substantial chunk of traffic.
Also, we'd get an alarm and cut them out of the consensus, for an example see... https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays#trotsky short summary: 747 exits suddenly appeared and were dropped from the consensus That said, smaller and slower sybil adversaries could go undetected so if you see something fishy then let us know! -Damian _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
