-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 11/21/2011 10:14 AM, Damian Johnson wrote: > Hi Fabio. What you're describing is a sybil attack. An attacker > definitely *wouldn't* get a majority of the exit traffic for those > destinations - clients weigh relay selection by heuristics reported > by the bandwidth authorities. Those authorities take a long time to > warm up to new relays, so it would take quite a bit of uptime > before they'd start seeing a substantial chunk of traffic. > > Also, we'd get an alarm and cut them out of the consensus, for an > example see... > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays#trotsky > > short summary: 747 exits suddenly appeared and were dropped from > the consensus > > That said, smaller and slower sybil adversaries could go undetected > so if you see something fishy then let us know! -Damian > _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing > list [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Good thing we trust Moritz, torservers.net is growing. :P Disclaimer: I have spoken with Moritz in the past and is very aware of these type of concerns and was making efforts to mitigate them. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJOyovzAAoJEJW/J8aB8dYIfbcIALOXkir+dsBSP0vAay7e7zx4 U6LMX4ZzDhpJz3kaQnl39e+EvZeCnFMtVAhbhVZlN7yLPf4n6u8vCc/IWuoF7ie+ CI28fEZ8EKLNbOmBeDd2bhKVqKMYVeE2Hk7PL/YR1pPUb6mR15PqliaLA3jS9FGc G8Jerya7teyTvx0b9JPxch+KN4FW+hrys+GwWOz1HIxZ/z4aehFkmKWqSin2dEQH vfvn9GTVw/8CqvTSNKE9M1O1WMcknHuwrj3mwiL0aqRHuA8HE0sl80/ONUNgIunY vCTbkly/UuKhUwC4PGiVImVt7fJPdebJg9WGBWCWPekGUtf1B83TfszXLh1wrho= =EKqx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
