On 06/28/2014 01:31 AM, grarpamp wrote: > On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 5:32 PM, coderman <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Juan <[email protected]> wrote: >> traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and >> out of the network. >>> ... Tor, by design, is useless against >>> governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US >>> government. >> >> last but not least, passive confirmation attacks are passe; the best >> attacks active. >> >> "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types" >> http://freehaven.net/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.pdf > > Pending a second read of such papers... I still think a network > that uses fixed external packet sizes and fills internode links > with chaff versions of same to meet some fixed clock rate... > would be more resistant to this. Afaik no network has tried > this yet.
What do you think of the anonymity network (Dissent) described in this working draft from Joan Feigenbaum and Bryan Ford?[1] [1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5307 -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
