Consider the consequences of publishing the actual addresses. The number of addresses is fine but the actual addresses should stay private for privacy and security reasons.
I’m aware there are crawers looking for new services to show however if the address is kept private only rouge HSDIRs are an issue and we can always generate new addresses and delete the old keys. I am running some Onion Services for SSH (clearnet disabled, you’ll need to be physically present if Tor has an issue!) and while I require SSH Keys it’d open a huge attack surface I’m trying to avoid. It’s basicaly an attempt at security by really advanced obscurity. Cordially, Nathaniel Suchy On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 9:53 AM <iwanle...@cock.li> wrote: > Can the Tor Project publish the list? Some sites have published lists of > new .onion addresses, for example: > http://onionsnjajzkhm5g.onion/onions.php?cat=20&pg=1&lang=en > http://zlal32teyptf4tvi.onion/ > http://56wr4dvq3abd2ivkf5z36nortvu7dgona55zqsihfaqo2aeg5er4moid.onion/ > > There may be no reason that the Tor project does it, but can the Tor > project not do it? :) > > The Tor Metrics has published the number of unique .onion addresses for > version 2 onion services in the network per day already. > https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html > > And if I act a relay, can I discover the number of unique .onion > addresses and new .onion addresses? If yes, is it good/bad to publish > lists of new .onion addresses? > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk