On Wed, September 21, 2016 11:15 am, Melinda Shore wrote:
>  On 9/21/16 5:23 AM, Tarah Wheeler wrote:
> > Hi, I'm Tarah, and I'm new at Symantec. I'll be reviewing and responding
> > to the CT redaction thread, and actively involved in proposals.
>
>  A few months ago Symantec had stated that they'll be publishing
>  redacted labels - is that still the case?

Symantec has stood up an RFC 6962-like log that supports an earlier
version of the redaction scheme, which reflects the thinking from 6962-bis
Draft 14.

It is not trusted by any CT client widely deployed, because it does not
implement RFC 6962 (which, as we know, does not support redaction).

Symantec has also had trouble, both with first-party and third-party
integrations (such as Venafi), with logging redacted certificates,
resulting in what might be described as 'over-redacted' certificates. That
is, certificates which are redacted even though their domains are public
and widely known, which is at conflict with Symantec's stated need for the
use case of redaction.

This has been summarized at
https://sslmate.com/blog/post/ct_redaction_in_chrome_53 for example, but
reflects redaction occurring for widely used, publicly disclosed domain
names - which seems at direct odds with the stated use cases.

Such previous explanations of Symantec's redaction policies can be found
at
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/privacy-redaction-and-certificate-transparency
and
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/balancing-certificate-transparency-and-privacy
, however, the evidence since these posts indicate an inconsistency in the
actual use case and policies.

This is perhaps a useful study into the utility, and the risk, of redaction.


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