> faces would seem to be lack of demand on the part of folks who consume client certificates. > I'm not aware of any of our customers (the few that use client certs) who also use a public CA, or even more than one.
With the relatively slow adoption of the EU's eIDAS legislation and thus national PKIs, the demand will probably grow, but within a decade. But it's unlikely that countries themselves will show any interest in participating in this process because the adoption of CT itself is far away. My humble prediction is that in a decade people will finally start using CT in the context of MTLS and find it somehow broken, that is if it's not taken into account right now. On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 4:04 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz= [email protected]> wrote: > > But I have to say, the core problem this proposal > faces would seem to be lack of demand on the part of folks who > consume client certificates. > > Agreed. In our experience, client certs are deployed from an enterprise > PKI, and the receiving consumers assume valid issuance. I'm not aware of > any of our customers (the few that use client certs) who also use a public > CA, or even more than one. > > Added the trans list. > > > _______________________________________________ > Trans mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans >
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