Excellent point, but then we have a known Mailserver that is spewing fake-mail. You can either drop all mail from this server - or examine the digital key header for all email coming from this server and drop the fake ones.
We could also employ Wayne Byarlay's idea and give each T-SMTP server its own digital key so that we can now build a web of trust across servers. If we run server-to-server traffic on a different protocol (also suggested earlier) we can actually leave the suspect mail on the suspect server and not download/accept the email until we have verified the authenticity of each email. This leaves the spammers server bunched up with his *own* spam... :-) On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 10:58, Brad Jorsch wrote: > On Mon, Jan 29, 2007 at 10:44:15AM -0500, jonc wrote: > > > > On the bright side, if we move to T-SMTP (requiring authenticated SMTP > > drop offs) then you could trace the phisher back to his vessel and then > > rock his boat. > > Not really. The phisher isn't going to do things right, he'll just > pretend he's forwarding a message that was originally authenticated by > some random joe. Same as they forge Received headers now. > > It'll catch zombies that send through the smarthost, though. -- TriLUG mailing list : http://www.trilug.org/mailman/listinfo/trilug TriLUG Organizational FAQ : http://trilug.org/faq/ TriLUG Member Services FAQ : http://members.trilug.org/services_faq/
