On 7 November 2018 at 11:51, Tom Rini <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]> > > A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack > when using the verified boot feature. The function fit_config_check_sig > has a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the > stack allocated array node_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass > the signature check when using verified boot. > > This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted. > > Signed-off-by: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]> > --- > common/image-sig.c | 5 +++++ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ U-Boot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-boot
