On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 02:51:46PM -0500, Tom Rini wrote:

> From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
> 
> A specially crafted FIT image makes it possible to overflow the stack
> with controlled values when using the verified boot feature. Depending
> on the memory layout, this could be used to overwrite configuration
> variables on the heap and setting them to 0, e.g. disable signature
> verification, thus bypassing it.
> 
> This change fixes a bug in fdt_find_regions where the fdt structure is
> parsed. A lower value than -1 of depth can lead to a buffer underflow
> write on the stack.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

-- 
Tom

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