Kathy --
Kathryn Blackmond Laskey wrote: >> On the contrary, if rational behaviour is defined, following Aristotle, >> as behaviour for which an actor is able to provide reasons when >> questioned, then I should think this definition is quite operational. > > > Yes, you are right, that is an operational definition. > > But have you had the experience of asking someone the reasons for > his/her behavior, and receiving a response that was blatantly > inconsistent and self-contradictory? For example, when I was a > teenager, I worked in a nursing home. One of the patients was convinced > that the staff was hiding her mother upstairs. She kept demanding that > we let her see her mother. She had what she considered good reasons for > her beliefs, and could provide them when questioned. In fact, the staff > found questioning her an amusing sport. Her reasons for her opinions > and behavior made for endless lunchtime stories. They changed from day > to day and were wildly at variance with observable facts, which she > blithely denied. This patient would satisfy your definition of > rational. Yet most people would consider her irrational. > > Would you consider her rational because she could provide reasons for > her beliefs and behavior? > > If so, is there any meaningful content to your theory of rationality? > Hold on a moment! I did not say this was *my* theory of rationality. I said this is how the word is used in the philosophy of argumentation and that such usage goes back to Aristotle. It is interesting that the recent (six decades) usage of the word by economists and quantitative decision-theorists has become so ingrained in us, that we have difficulty accepting another usage, even when that other usage has historical priority. As it happens, I think it is possible to create a coherent and meaningful theory of rational action building from the philosophers' usage of "rational", and modern philosophers of argumentation have been working in this direction. I don't think they are there yet, however. -- Peter
