Ronald J. Allen wrote [as reported by Joseph Halpern]: > ... "Causation" in the law is virtually > never about causation; it is instead about responsibility. Conclusions > in terms of causation usually are merely the means of carrying out those > determinations of responsibility.
While I do not specialize in "legal causation," Ron Allen's statement strikes me as an exaggeration. While it is undeniable (I think) that law's purposes (and law's texts) influence how judges understand & interpret causation requirements (in the law) and while law's purposes certainly influence how causation questions are addressed in legal proceedings, I am suspicious of the implicit suggestion that the question of causation in law [generally] presents us with two entirely disjoint possibilities: causation requirements in law are either a matter of policy or they present an epistemic or empirical question but they don't [normally] present us with both kinds of questions. I suspect that causation requirements in law normally _do_ present both kinds of questions in legal proceedings and that the law, for reasons of "policy," instructs judges [usually only implicitly] - -- and eventually jurors, if there are any -- to apply certain epistemic criteria -- or, if you will, empirical criteria -- rather than others. I think when judges or jurors are asked to resolve a causation question, they ordinarily think they are being asked to resolve a factual question, albeit, perhaps, in a certain way. But what do I know? I teach the law of evidence and I teach fact investigation, but I do not teach subjects such as torts, criminal law etc. - -- though I confess to having taught criminal law in the long-distant past. I just want to register an uniformed law professor's skepticism about Ron Allen's apparent(?) position that legal causation is [normally} _ALL_ a matter of policy. He may be right, but, if he is, I am very much surprised. Peter T
