rm extra line, english, mention timestamps

** Description changed:

  I've noticed that
  `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling` had the
  `Vulnerable` value despite keeping the system up-to-date. The mitigation
- microcode is available but not in used. It seems that the issue might be
+ microcode is available but not used. It seems that the issue might be
  the way the operations are ordered during start-up: verdict on the
  mitigation is potentially made before the microcode is loaded (as far as
  I understand).
  
  In any case, I don't know why my system doesn't have the mitigation
- enabled, as I would expect this to be taken care of by default during
+ enabled. I would expect this to be taken care of by default during
  security updates or setup.
- 
  
  ```bash
  grep -o 'microcode[^ ]* [^ ]*' /proc/cpuinfo | sort -u
  ```
  reports: `microcode   : 0xbe`
  
- 
  ```bash
  dmesg | grep -i microcode
  ```
- reports:
+ reports (notice the timestamps):
  ```
  [    0.466934] microcode: Current revision: 0x000000be
  [    0.466942] microcode: Updated early from: 0x00000086
  ```
  while
  ```bash
  dmesg | grep -i -E 'gds|mitigat'
  ```
- reports
+ reports (notice the timestamps):
  ```
  [    0.083727] mitigations: Enabled attack vectors: user_kernel, user_user, 
guest_host, guest_guest, SMT mitigations: auto
  [    0.083733] Speculative Store Bypass: Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass 
disabled via prctl
  [    0.083735] Spectre V2 : Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS
  [    0.083737] ITS: Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks
  [    0.083739] Spectre V1 : Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user 
pointer sanitization
  [    0.083747] Spectre V2 : mitigation: Enabling conditional Indirect Branch 
Prediction Barrier
  [    0.083750] GDS: Vulnerable
  [    0.083756] Spectre V2 : Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on 
syscall and VM exit
  ```
  
  ```bash
  rdmsr -0 0x10a
  ```
  outputs `000000000a005c6b`
  ```bash
  rdmsr -0 0x123
  ```
  outputs `0000000000000010`
  
- $ sudo rdmsr -0 0x123
- 0000000000000010
- 
- 
- Let me know if you need more diagnostic listings, I'm happy to provide 
whatever's needed.
+ Let me know if you need more diagnostic listings, I'm happy to provide
+ whatever's needed.
  
  A LLM has provided the following temporary fix - using a systemd service:
  ```
  # /etc/systemd/system/gds-reenable.service
  [Unit]
  Description=Re-enable Intel GDS mitigation
  After=multi-user.target
  
  [Service]
  Type=oneshot
  ExecStart=/usr/sbin/modprobe msr
  ExecStart=/usr/sbin/wrmsr -a 0x123 0
  
  [Install]
  WantedBy=multi-user.target
  ```
  
  I've checked also the effect of setting the value of the MSR 0x123
  register to 0 using a program (source provided by the LLM) that makes
  many call to `_mm256_i32gather_epi32`. There is indeed a noticeable
  difference in time: ~29ns/call with the value `0` vs ~15ns with the
  value `0x10`, which I'm assuming is proof that the mitigation is enabled
  whenever the MSR 0x123 register is set to 0 (instead of 0x10).

** Description changed:

  I've noticed that
  `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling` had the
  `Vulnerable` value despite keeping the system up-to-date. The mitigation
  microcode is available but not used. It seems that the issue might be
  the way the operations are ordered during start-up: verdict on the
  mitigation is potentially made before the microcode is loaded (as far as
  I understand).
  
  In any case, I don't know why my system doesn't have the mitigation
  enabled. I would expect this to be taken care of by default during
  security updates or setup.
  
  ```bash
  grep -o 'microcode[^ ]* [^ ]*' /proc/cpuinfo | sort -u
  ```
  reports: `microcode   : 0xbe`
  
  ```bash
  dmesg | grep -i microcode
  ```
  reports (notice the timestamps):
  ```
  [    0.466934] microcode: Current revision: 0x000000be
  [    0.466942] microcode: Updated early from: 0x00000086
  ```
  while
  ```bash
  dmesg | grep -i -E 'gds|mitigat'
  ```
  reports (notice the timestamps):
  ```
  [    0.083727] mitigations: Enabled attack vectors: user_kernel, user_user, 
guest_host, guest_guest, SMT mitigations: auto
  [    0.083733] Speculative Store Bypass: Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass 
disabled via prctl
  [    0.083735] Spectre V2 : Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS
  [    0.083737] ITS: Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks
  [    0.083739] Spectre V1 : Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user 
pointer sanitization
  [    0.083747] Spectre V2 : mitigation: Enabling conditional Indirect Branch 
Prediction Barrier
  [    0.083750] GDS: Vulnerable
  [    0.083756] Spectre V2 : Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on 
syscall and VM exit
  ```
  
  ```bash
  rdmsr -0 0x10a
  ```
  outputs `000000000a005c6b`
  ```bash
  rdmsr -0 0x123
  ```
  outputs `0000000000000010`
  
  Let me know if you need more diagnostic listings, I'm happy to provide
  whatever's needed.
  
  A LLM has provided the following temporary fix - using a systemd service:
  ```
  # /etc/systemd/system/gds-reenable.service
  [Unit]
  Description=Re-enable Intel GDS mitigation
  After=multi-user.target
  
  [Service]
  Type=oneshot
  ExecStart=/usr/sbin/modprobe msr
  ExecStart=/usr/sbin/wrmsr -a 0x123 0
  
  [Install]
  WantedBy=multi-user.target
  ```
  
- I've checked also the effect of setting the value of the MSR 0x123
+ I've also checked the effect of setting the value of the MSR 0x123
  register to 0 using a program (source provided by the LLM) that makes
  many call to `_mm256_i32gather_epi32`. There is indeed a noticeable
  difference in time: ~29ns/call with the value `0` vs ~15ns with the
  value `0x10`, which I'm assuming is proof that the mitigation is enabled
  whenever the MSR 0x123 register is set to 0 (instead of 0x10).

** Description changed:

  I've noticed that
  `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling` had the
  `Vulnerable` value despite keeping the system up-to-date. The mitigation
  microcode is available but not used. It seems that the issue might be
  the way the operations are ordered during start-up: verdict on the
  mitigation is potentially made before the microcode is loaded (as far as
  I understand).
  
  In any case, I don't know why my system doesn't have the mitigation
  enabled. I would expect this to be taken care of by default during
  security updates or setup.
  
  ```bash
  grep -o 'microcode[^ ]* [^ ]*' /proc/cpuinfo | sort -u
  ```
  reports: `microcode   : 0xbe`
  
  ```bash
  dmesg | grep -i microcode
  ```
  reports (notice the timestamps):
  ```
  [    0.466934] microcode: Current revision: 0x000000be
  [    0.466942] microcode: Updated early from: 0x00000086
  ```
  while
  ```bash
  dmesg | grep -i -E 'gds|mitigat'
  ```
  reports (notice the timestamps):
  ```
  [    0.083727] mitigations: Enabled attack vectors: user_kernel, user_user, 
guest_host, guest_guest, SMT mitigations: auto
  [    0.083733] Speculative Store Bypass: Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass 
disabled via prctl
  [    0.083735] Spectre V2 : Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS
  [    0.083737] ITS: Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks
  [    0.083739] Spectre V1 : Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user 
pointer sanitization
  [    0.083747] Spectre V2 : mitigation: Enabling conditional Indirect Branch 
Prediction Barrier
  [    0.083750] GDS: Vulnerable
  [    0.083756] Spectre V2 : Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on 
syscall and VM exit
  ```
  
  ```bash
  rdmsr -0 0x10a
  ```
  outputs `000000000a005c6b`
  ```bash
  rdmsr -0 0x123
  ```
  outputs `0000000000000010`
  
  Let me know if you need more diagnostic listings, I'm happy to provide
  whatever's needed.
  
  A LLM has provided the following temporary fix - using a systemd service:
  ```
  # /etc/systemd/system/gds-reenable.service
  [Unit]
  Description=Re-enable Intel GDS mitigation
  After=multi-user.target
  
  [Service]
  Type=oneshot
  ExecStart=/usr/sbin/modprobe msr
  ExecStart=/usr/sbin/wrmsr -a 0x123 0
  
  [Install]
  WantedBy=multi-user.target
  ```
  
  I've also checked the effect of setting the value of the MSR 0x123
- register to 0 using a program (source provided by the LLM) that makes
- many call to `_mm256_i32gather_epi32`. There is indeed a noticeable
+ register to 0 using a C program (source provided by the LLM) that makes
+ many calls to `_mm256_i32gather_epi32`. There is indeed a noticeable
  difference in time: ~29ns/call with the value `0` vs ~15ns with the
  value `0x10`, which I'm assuming is proof that the mitigation is enabled
  whenever the MSR 0x123 register is set to 0 (instead of 0x10).

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2172675

Title:
  Boot ordering: GDS mitigation status set earlier than microcode is
  updated

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