Excerpts from Grace S. Ibingira�s 1980 book, African Upheavals Since Independence (emphasis added, unless otherwise stated)
Ch. 6 Uganda: Fundamental Causes of the 1966 Revolution
a. The UPC�s Resolute Determination to Obtain and Exercise Absolute Power
b. Efforts to Impose a One-Party System
c. Parliamentary Battles for Reform of Electoral Law
d. Monopoly and Misuse of the Security Forces � subsections:
(i) Politicizing the Armed Forces on an Ethnic Basis
(ii) Internal Security
(iii) External Threat?
(iv) The Coice, Protection, and Promotion of Idi Amin
e. Efforts to Monopolize Government Power
e. The revival of Primordial Fears � subsections:
(i) Controlling the Central Government Public service
(ii) Controlling Local Governments
f. THE REVIVAL OF PRIMORDIAL FEARS � subsections:
(i) Buganda
(ii) The Dissolution of the UPC/KY Alliance
(iii) Buganda�s Failure
(iv) Escalation of Intra-UPC Conflict
This continues the last excerpt, which ended thus (section a.):
�Of course, all (or most) political leaders want to attain, hold, or exercise power. But what happens when the objective is to attain and hold power at all costs and for all the time, as was Obote�s real ambition? Conflict and violence sooner or later become inevitable, especially when there is a powerful opposition as there was in Uganda. Most of Obote�s close colleagues in the party and government looked at him initially as an honorable man, especially as his statements seldom betrayed his real intentions. Similarly, Parliament and the country at large were prepared to give support to his administration. He had a chance to become a great Ugandan leader; although not charismatic, he was intelligent, articulate, and a nationalist��
�The country he inherited, though multiethnic and historically divided, after more than sixty years of orderly colonial administration had evolved a tradition for order and respect for the law and established authority. But, quite rightly in his calculations, Obote foresaw a future political struggle, a possible challenge from the DP and the KY, and he chose force to deal with that challenge rather than persuasion and political contest. Thus, he determined the country�s future instability and official violence from which it has not yet recovered.
�In a country with deep-rooted interethnic and intraethnic cleavages as in Uganda, the leadership may have (among others) two options for handling the population. The first option involves maintaining or accentuating ethnic divisions in order to resolve or shelve problems or to keep power, in the old classical colonial mold of �divide and rule.� Obote employed this tactic constantly. The second and preferable option is one of continous effort at genuine persuasion and compromise. He was hailed by many, especially outsiders, as a conciliator because he compromised with Buganda to attain independence. However, this temporary conciliation was in fact forced upon him privately, I know, against his will by some of his senior colleagues in the party, largely because it was the only way to defeat the DP and inherit the mantle of power on independence. The tactic of divide and rule was useful to his ends both because it kept his potential opponents busy fighting each other, as well as because it consequently gave him precious tme, as he had hoped, with which to bulid and exploit ethnic relations favourable to him in various departments of government. The more he he extolled the virtues of national unity in public, the more he exploited and accentuated ethnic divisions in private��.
EFFORTS TO IMPOSE A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM
�We discuss later the nature of of one-party systems as a whole, but for the moment it should be noted that there is real merit in a one-party system only if it is genuinely representative of society and has sound leadership and objectives � in the context of Ugandan politics, the UPC was quite uncertain of its strength. Despite the crossings to the government side, however, of elected DP and KY members in Parliament and the district councils in search of better material prospects, the DP and KY still had impressive followings. Any attempt to impose a one-party system, therefore, was bound to be resisted with unpleasant consequences. But in Obote�s calculations any resistance to the one party at some future date would be crushed by his army.
�Consequently, while touring his home district he issued a public statement on 7 January 1964 that advocated the creation of a one-party state in Uganda, partly because �organized opposition against the government is a typical capitalist notion and concept,� and partly because the opposition outside Parliament was �irresponsible, opportunistic and subversive.� 3 Not only were these reasons distorted but they were never discussed either within the policy-forming organs of the UPC or the cabinet. I was accutely aware of the Nigerian misuse of federal power to install Akintola and destroy the Action Group in western Nigeria and its violent results. Thus is fear of a similar prospect at home, I immediately issued a public statement making the important reservations, that while we might work for a one-party system, the UPC would never introduce it through force and legislation. It would come through the free choice of the people in elections.4 Notwithstanding this mitigation, which Obote resented, there were vigorous and public protests from the DP and the KY. To understand why it was destabilizing to impose a one-party system one needs to know the relative strength of parties in the country.
�The UPC was poorly organized and its strength rested more on the individual following of its leaders from the different areas than on effective organization and coherent philosophy. It is significant , for instance, that during the first crucial elections that led to self-government in February 1961, the party had for its headquarters campaign effort one old duplicating machine, one Land Rover (donated by President Nyerere), and a few typewriters manned by a few unpaid personnel. This was not the fault of the then secretary-general of the party, John Kakonge, who was responsible for the day-to-day administration. It was rather the fault of Obote�s relative disinterest or inability to canvass more support for its organization. But the development of Uganda also had insured relatively more attachment to local leadership. Consequently, individual candidates in both local and national elections won mostly by their own effort. As the results of the 1961 and 1962 general elections show (see Table 6.1), UPC was clearly in a minority, thogh the largest single group. It could neither compare with the CPP in Ghana nr TANU in Tanzania, which were increasingly Obote�s models.
�The independence government could only be formed in coalition with twenty-one Bugandan representatives. Outwardly, the UPC seemed to have done better in district councils. Within a year of independence all local governments in district councils, including the three western kingdoms, were UPC dominated. It was only Buganda that remained impregnable. Despite this showing, paradoxically the UPC was experiencing more internal problems as a party. The apparent decline of official opposition led to considerable in-fighting within the party. The larger it grew, the more fragmented it became. It was difficult and often impossible to enforce discipline and a common policy.
�Practically in every district or kingdom there was serious intraparty conflict among UPC followers, which though rooted in diverse causes would have been containable with better party discipline. But Obote�s style was to keep the party divided to enable him to play one faction against another.
�The Acholi district in the North, despite the fact that Obote had wooed its sons in the security forces, was for a long time so bady divided as to paralyze its local administration. The district was ethnically homogeneous but was divided on a religious basis betwee catholics and Protestants and on a subregional basis between East and West Acholi. Often it defied central government (UPC) policy. Despite the urging of the UPC central committee to unify the Acholi leadership, Obote preferred to keep the Acholi fighting each other since a unified Acholi would worry him as it would be capable of producing rival leadership with greater support in an already ethnicised army.
�In Toro, a rival UPC group, �Kagorogoro�, under Rwambarali set up its own party organization with Obote�s secret consent and material support to oppose the lawfully consituted government of Samson Rusoke.
�In Kigezi, not only was the party handicapped by the rivalries among among the three ethnic groups (Bakiga, Bohororo, and Banyarwanda) but was also deeply divided by by the rivalry between Lwamafa and Bikangaga, its leaders of national stature.
�Similarly, in Ankole there were two UPCs, one under Bananuka and another under james Kahigiriza, who was in government. The story of factionalism applied to all districts.
�On the other hand, the DP and the KY, though their numbers in Parliament had been reduced through the crossing of their members to the government side, were still firmly established among the people.
�It should be explained that the most common reason people switched to the government as they did was to seek reward from the government either in state corporations or by appointment to government commissions in order to bring in extra income and influence, for example.5 But once a member changes his party, it is quite uncertain to what extent, he carries his constituents with him. They certainly do not share meaningfully in the material rewar he personally gets, and it is more like that the majority would still support the original party. One could sense this in the solid support for the opposition found in public meetings of the constituencies of former members of the DP.
�As for Buganda, there was absolutely no question that it was solidly in support of the KY. The Baganda MPs who switched to the UPC, had never been elected by the people, but had been indirectly elected by the Buganda Lukiiko. They had no proven or credible electoral support, although admittedly men were sound men; they were conditioned by the Buganda society and government of the time.
�Given the still basically strong opposition and the disorganization and and indiscipline within the UPC, it was imprudent to impose a one-party system. Yet such are the politics of winner-take-all philosophy.
�Within the circumstances of Uganda at the time, the most realistic approach would have been to offer the DP and the KY positions in a national government with a merger of all the parties, just the Uganda National People�s Union had merged with the Uganda National Congress to form the UPC.
�Obote was in a strong position to do this for, despite the basically strong potential, the opposition was a bit demoralized by the constant defections of its MPs to the government. The offer was made because while Obote wanted the DP and the KY to cease to exist, he was apprehensive to accept their members in large numbers into his party. He preferred to have his cake and eat it too. As we shall later see, the KY was crippled in January 1966 and the whole opposition banned in December 1969 after an attempt on Obote�s life.
3 See report of this statement in Uganda Argus (8 and 9 January 1964); the reply of the opposition groups in Uganda Argus (9, 11 and 22 January 1964). See discussion of this by A. G. Gingyera Pinycwa, �Prospects for a one-party system in Uganda,� East Africa Journal (October 1968).
4 Uganda Argus (11 January 1964)
5 It is significant that there is a general rule that those politicians who cross over to government from the opposition nor those governments which receive them are ever prepared to hold new elections to test whether or not the voters support the change.
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