By Apollo Milton Obote in Zambia
Dec 21 - 27, 2003
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The storm is not over yet. After President Yoweri Museveni recently accused former IGG Augustine Ruzinda of exaggerating his role in Fronasa, which is said to have played a major role in the struggle to over throw Idi Amin, former President, Apollo Milton Obote says it is all lies; Museveni and his Fronasa did little or nothing in the liberation way. In a three-part series, we bring you most intriguing Obote's account. There is some dispute in Uganda on what political force removed Amin's military dictatorship. The Amin coup was effected and supported by powerful countries abroad.
Had the UPC done nothing, there would have been no Ugandan political force in the removal of Amin. When the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF) and Uganda Militia then known as Kikosi Maalum had already captured Mbarara and Masaka, the Tanzanian Government was pressurised by the then British Labour Government to hold a Conference to agree on a Uganda Administration to succeed Amin. I was the first to receive in the forenoon on April 11, 1979, the news of the fall of Amin. No member of Uganda National Liberation Front Administration (UNLF) could have been the first or even amongst the first 100 people to receive the news. They could not because they were never involved and were not in the war against Amin and were also, as their record in office showed, not a political force. Their Party, the UNLF and their Administration both became realities because the British labour Government pressurised Tanzania to ensure that the Uganda successor Administration to Amin was not led by the UPC. No member of the UNLF Administration and not even Museveni who entered Uganda during the war on the coat tails of the Tanzanian Army had participated in the raising of Kikosi Maalum. Throughout the UNLF Administration, Kikosi Maalum was known as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) but another Militia which, after January 1986 claimed to have also fought Amin under the name of FRONASA and with Museveni as its leader was not known. Before the UNLF itself was formed, I had sent Teams to Masaka and Ankole to mobilise the people to support the war efforts for the overthrow of Amin. On April, 11 1979 when Kampala fell to Kikosi Maalum and TPDF, Museveni was in Fort Portal staying with Princess Elizabeth Bagaya in the Omukama's Palace.
Before dawn on April, when the invading armies (TPDF and Kikosi Maalum) were around King's College Budo, the Tanzanian officers who were in overall command of the two armies asked Kikosi Maalum to enter Kampala first. The ground given was that Kikosi Maalum knew the nooks of Kampala better than the TPDF. When Kampala fell, what the officers of that army wanted most was a telephone to ring Dar Es Salaam and report the fact to their political leader, the UPC President. Since the telephone lines to countries outside Uganda were down, the Kikosi Maalum worked hard to find someone who could reactivate them. After making it, late Maj. General David Oyite-Ojok placed a call to me. The news that David gave me was most exhilarating. The struggle the UPC had waged from January 25, 1971 came to an end that day when Amin's dictatorship fell. The first thing I did was to ring President Nyerere to report what I had heard. That day, we had a double celebration at the residence because Mrs. Oyite-Ojok delivered a baby boy in the afternoon. Although it was the Kikosi Maalum, the Ugandan Militia Force raised by the UPC leader and members which entered Kampala first and sent Amin running, the UPC has always praised, thanked and acknowledged the political force which was the greatest factor which removed Amin's military dictatorship. That political force, was the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The UPC had, in the 1960s' built cordial relations with the Tanganyika National Union (TANU), which later changed its name to CCM. Also during the same period, the UPC also buil same strong relations with the On January 25, 1971 the day of Amin coup, I was in Singapore where I had gone on the pleadings of the leaders of TANU, UNIP and the African National Congress (ANC). I had decided not to go to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). An election to the National Assembly was due in April and the Electoral Commission under the Chairmanship of Ateker Ejalu had already demarcated 126 constituencies that were to be used in 1980.
The UPC Government was finalising the writing of the second five-year development plan following the very successful completion and implementation of the first five-year development plan launched in 1963. The plan saw the construction of 22 rural hospitals, dispensaries, primary and secondary schools, tarmacking of roads such as from Masaka to Kabale and from Kampala-Gulu And the Lira; extension of the railway line from Soroti to Pakwach and piped water in Kisoro; valley tanks in Teso, Lango and Karamoja, boreholes throughout the country, and ranches in Luwero and a special livestock Development Scheme in Buganda. On January 26, I received in my hotel two Tanzanian ministers sent from India by President Nyerere, who was on a State visit to India, to take me to Dar Es Salaam. We left Nairobi in the afternoon and on arrival at Dar Es Salaam, the struggle for the removal of Amin began in earnest and never ceased until I received the telephone call from David Oyite-Ojok. Although I had a friendly and conducive base which was near Uganda where party members could easily discuss how to reverse the situation, there were also until October 1978 difficult imponderables, not least the OAU Charter Provision of "No interference in the internal affairs" of a member State to which Tanzania was a strong subscriber. There were also the implications of the indecent and hasty recognition of Amin's brutal dictatorship British Government within 10 days of the coup. The first very adverse condition was that leading politicians were all supporting the brutal military dictatorship. They wrote an open letter to President Nyerere pleading that I be not granted asylum in Tanzania. Not so many leading politicians concentrated on the students. The UPC Government had encouraged the students to build a very strong National Union of Students of Uganda (NUSU). The political job seekers and lovers of dictatorship went to the students particularly at Makerere. The student leaders were urged to support the dictatorship because allegedly "Amin was killing only Obote's people"! To the job seekers and lovers of dictatorship (some of whom were to be the organisers of the conference at which the UNLF was formed in March 1979 and became leaders of the UNLF), the massacres of citizens of Uganda was not revulsive if only they could become ministers. Amin appointed some to his cabinet and some to the East African Community at a time when Tanzania's non-recognition of Amin also embraced no co-operation with him on the affairs of the East African Community. In March 1971, I received an invitation from the Sudanese Government to go to Khartoum where a European mercenary was due to stand trial. President Nyerere expressed much pleasure with the invitation and urged me to accept it without delay.
He saw it as an opportunity for me to raise a guerrilla army in Sudan. There were reports at that time of the arrests in Uganda of some people who had tried to travel to Tanzania for military training. Before leaving for Khartoum, I contacted UPC leaders in Uganda and discussed with them how best men could go to Sudan for military training. It was not a propitious proposition because there was at that time a war in Southern Sudan between the Southern Sudanese and the Government in Khartoum. I asked President Nimieri to allow me to recruit men from Uganda and bring them to Sudan. I also asked for facilities for the Sudanese army to train the men as a guerrilla army. The request was referred to the Sudanese army command where it was rejected. I asked for my staff to be allowed to go to Oraba Market (north of Koboko) where I knew the people of Uganda, Zaire and Sudan sold and bought goods. This was investigated and was found to be a safe route. From the market it was easy at normal times to go to Koboko and then to Arua and from Arua to Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Apac and Masindi. We agreed that the recruiting area should cover the whole of the northern region plus Teso and Masindi Districts. We had one very serious drawback; we had no money. I rejected a suggestion that I write to party leaders in the recruiting area and ask for monetary contributions. All members of my staff volunteered to go to Oraba and then to Uganda but I selected seven, one of whom was to remain at or near Oraba to receive the recruits. After discussions on how the recruitment was to be done, I wrote letters to UPC leaders in the recruitment area. Each letter had something known to me as a way of proving that the letter was from me. The recruitment operation was very successful. None of the recruits or party leaders ran into trouble and all my six staff members returned to Sudan safely. The Sudanese Government and army gave us assistance to embark on agriculture. I visited the camp and talked to the men frequently. After some months of vigorous training, I proposed to the Sudanese Government to assist in the infiltration of the men back to their districts in Uganda through the route that brought them to Sudan, but this time going with concealed weapons. The request was rejected. In May 1972 through Ethiopian negotiations, the Sudanese Government and the Southerners concluded an agreement to cease hostilities. The President of Sudan who gave me the news also told me that my men would have to leave Owiny-Kibul because his government wanted the place to be "Assembly Point" for the Southern combatants. The Ugandans had made the place very habitable with large farms. I reported the development to President Nyerere who sent an emissary to Khartoum. With the support of the emissary, I requested to go to the men but we were told that despite the cease-fire, the South was very fluid and it was not safe for me. Sudan offered to get a ship to take the men to Dar es Salaam but the emissary proposed Tanga. Soon thereafter Sudan arranged for me to fly to Dar es Salaam. The 700 men, in fact 743 men I left in Sudan boarded a ship at Port Said for Tanga. When the ship arrived at Tanga Port, only a few of the men were not sick and some had died on the way and buried at Sea. It was learnt that the ship used to ferry cattle to Aden. The cause of the illness on board was meningitis. From Tanga Port, the men were taken to Andeni, a very fertile place not far from Tanga. I kept contact with party leaders in various parts of the country. In August 1972, it was reported that Amin had claimed to have been told by God in a dream that he must deport all persons of Asian origin. A date for their mass deportation was set in September. President Nyerere told me that his Intelligence service and Museveni had advised that an invasion of Uganda be mounted to coincide with the date of deportations. What the President told me sounded to me as a fairy tale but diplomacy could not allow me to say so to the benefactor President. I had in Masaka, for instance, a former minister in the Kabaka's government who always rang me whenever he was in his Kampala house. Because in Jinja and Mbarara UPC was too strong, I could not believe that Museveni could recruit thousands of men and arm them without the UPC leaders knowing anything. It turned out that what the President told me was, in fact, a fairy tale. Because Nyerere had accepted an invasion of Uganda in September 1972, I was asked and could not refuse to go to Andeni to prepare the 700 men from Sudan for the invasion. I discussed first the proposed invasion with the officers only who told me that although many of the men were still sick, everyone except the very sick would want to be in the invasion if confirmed. I address the men first, followed by briefs by company commanders. At the end of the day, everyone except the very sick volunteered to go to war. I addressed the men again before leaving for Dar es Salaam. The invasion plan was prepared by the Tanzanian Army and while the plan was being prepared, I kept receiving report after report from the UPC leaders in Uganda disclaiming the presence in their areas of thousands of armed men raised by Museveni. The team that I had sent to Mbarara, reported that all party branches in Ankole were tightly under the control of the district executive and that no recruitment could have taken place without branch executives coming to know. I therefore picked up courage and told President Nyerere that the UPC leaders in Uganda had reported that there were no thousands of armed men in Jinja, Masaka and Mbarara. The President's response was stark. He said, "Milton, if we miss this opportunity to hit at Amin, there will be no other opportunity." Those words became real after the failure of the invasion until November 1978. Because Nyerere had accepted an invasion of Uganda in September 1972, I was asked and could not refuse to go to Andeni to prepare the 700 men from Sudan for the invasion. I discussed first the proposed invasion with the officers only who told me that although many of the men were still sick, everyone except the very sick would want to be in the invasion if confirmed. I address the men first, followed by briefs by company commanders. At the end of the day, everyone except the very sick volunteered to go to war. I addressed the men again before leaving for Dar es Salaam. The invasion plan was prepared by the Tanzanian Army and while the plan was being prepared, I kept receiving report after report from the UPC leaders in Uganda disclaiming the presence in their areas of thousands of armed men raised by Museveni. The team that I had sent to Mbarara, reported that all party branches in Ankole were tightly under the control of the district executive and that no recruitment could have taken place without branch executives coming to know. I therefore picked up courage and told President Nyerere that the UPC leaders in Uganda had reported that there were no thousands of armed men in Jinja, Masaka and Mbarara. The President's response was stark. He said, "Milton, if we miss this opportunity to hit at Amin, there will be no other opportunity." Those words became real after the failure of the invasion until November 1978. When the invasion plan had been prepared by the TPDF, I went again accompanied by a Tanzanian minister and addressed the men and bid them farewell. On return to Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere told me that the Tanzanian Army had suggested that if I could find a pilot, some of my men could be flown to Entebbe on the might of the invasion. The plan was for Tanzania to commandeer an East African Airways aircraft from a Tanzanian Airport. I knew but not intimately some pilots of the East African Airways who, after all, had been recruited by the UPC Government in the 1960s. The proposal and the plan were so delicate that I failed to find a suitable way to put them to a pilot. Days passed and as on cue, a Ugandan who was employed by the East African Airways came to see me. I knew him and his father very well. |
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