For the first time in its history Kenya has an occupying military force in
another country. When its troops crossed the Somali border in 2011, and
eventually took Kismayo earlier this year, the feeling was that this
assertive change in foreign policy was going to cause some kind of reaction.
Abdullahi Boru Halake, a Kenyan political analyst says that Nairobi has
been in the crosshairs of Al Shabaab since Kenyan forces intervened in
Somalia October 2011.
So how do you explain the Alshabab attacks on Kenya before The Kenyan
forces went to Somalia? Now read the question and understand it before you
go loopy on me. If the Westgate was because of the Kenyan army in Somalia,
why did they attack Kenya before the army went to Somalia? Now yes I know
that Al Shabaab is demanding a pull out of Kenyan forces, and they are
threatening to hit Kenya anytime and anywhere, but why did they hit Kenya
before it went to Somalia?
Let us drive/spin this car in reverse for a second here.
EM
On the 49th
Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni and Dr. Kiiza Besigye Uganda is in anarchy"
Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni na Dk. Kiiza Besigye Uganda ni katika machafuko"
From: [email protected]
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Robukui .
Sent: Saturday, September 28, 2013 5:52 AM
To: UAH
Subject: {UAH} KENYA'S 'SOMALIA PROBLEM'
Most visitors who have spent any length of time in Nairobi have been to the
Westgate Centre. This US-style mall complex, situated in the wealthy
Westlands region of the city, has profited in recent years from the
plentiful expat and middle class Kenyan shilling. However, its not a place
I have much love for the clear delineation of Nairobis haves and
have-nots is marked out by the rich folk who enter up its steps and the poor
street-hawkers who hang about in the parking lot and try to sell you stuff.
However, I cant deny that during trips to the city I become part of this
dynamic and, like most, Ive spent time in the air-conditioned comfort of
Art Cafe (a posh Nairobi chain of coffee shops) using the free wifi and,
when I was there during Marchs general election, filing a couple of pieces.
That such a violent and abhorrent act should take place in Westgate was no
accident it was carefully chosen by people who knew how they could have
the greatest impact on Kenya and get the most coverage internationally:
strike where the rich and the foreign hang out.
This is a place that symbolises the countrys confident new wealth: The
growing economy, the two-fingers-to-the-west election of ICC-indicted Uhuru
Kenyatta, the evident, but incomplete, Africa rising narrative. But it
also demonstrates the extent of the Somalia-shaped problem Kenya has on its
doorstep.
For the first time in its history Kenya has an occupying military force in
another country. When its troops crossed the Somali border in 2011, and
eventually took Kismayo earlier this year, the feeling was that this
assertive change in foreign policy was going to cause some kind of reaction.
Abdullahi Boru Halake, a Kenyan political analyst says that Nairobi has
been in the crosshairs of Al Shabaab since Kenyan forces intervened in
Somalia October 2011. We had closely contested elections and the ongoing ICC
cases that took much of the attention. In a way, up to this time, we have
dodged bullets/bombs.
Stig Jarle Hansen, author of
<http://africanarguments.org/2013/04/25/review-al-shabaab-in-somalia-the-his
tory-and-ideology-of-a-militant-islamist-group-2005-%E2%80%93-2012-%E2%80%93
-by-magnus-taylor/> Al Shabaab in Somalia, states that rumours of Al
Shabaabs demise have always been greatly exaggerated: Shabaab has lost
teritory and has faced a conflict over Omar Hamami, but it is better than
ever in conducting terrorist attacks
conventional means are more exhausted.
Indeed, up until now Nairobi seemed to have got off fairly lightly with a
few grenade attacks (generally on bars), which one Kenyan journalist
speculated to me was, in part, a sign of local business disputes, rather
than Islamic militancy. There was also a nasty matatu bombing in Eastleigh,
the predominantly Somali district of the city. Eastleigh has also suffered
from a police crackdown on its population, who have for many years been
distrusted by other Kenyans, both for their connection to the crime and
warlordism of Somalia, but also for their success in business.
A noticeable security increase in shops was the most obvious consequence of
the Kenyan invasion whilst Al Shabaab has continually asserted that they
would drive the occupiers into the sea. But the efficacy of placing a few
more guards with metal detectors on the doors seemed debatable. This would
be unlikely to deter a really determined attacker, as Westgate now seems to
show.
The eastern Somali region of the country was more obviously affected, with a
number of attacks taking place near the border, particularly in the town of
Garissa, which included a mass shooting at a church in July 2012 that killed
15 people. In the understandable drama of the last 2 days (which exceeds
anything Kenya has experienced since the US embassy bombing in 1998) we
should not forget these lower-profile killings.
Kenya has a genuine security problem with Somalia which is unlikely to be
addressed by the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from the country. Hallake,
again, describes the Westgate attack as being a case of a systemic
intelligence failure which is a function of intelligence aligning itself
with politics rather than being a professional outfit
the case for an
enhanced and deepened security sector reform has never been this urgent.
Stig Hansen says that Kenya is not even close to disrupting Shabaabs
capacity to carry out sophisticated attacks of this nature.
To fight this threat Kenya is going to need more international support with
its intelligence and counter-terrorism strategy. This is something western
countries are well-qualified and capable of providing. No one wants East
Africas most important city to descend further into fear and paranoia given
its key role as a regional hub for business, diplomacy and the development
sector. Kenya should also avoid a knee-jerk crackdown on its Somali
population, something that has the potential to stimulate yet further
violence, which is no doubt what the attackers intended.
So this is probably going to mean more engagement with the Kenyan security
and intelligence services at a time when western powers have been trying to
keep the new government at arms length whilst its two top men are on trial
at the ICC.
If the Westgate attack shows us anything its that Al Shabaab remains
organised and dangerous and Kenyas Somalia problem is nowhere near solved.
Magnus Taylor is Editor of African Arguments.
Viele GruBe
Robukui
_____
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.2242 / Virus Database: 3222/6205 - Release Date: 09/27/13
_______________________________________________
Ugandanet mailing list
[email protected]
http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/ugandanet
UGANDANET is generously hosted by INFOCOM http://www.infocom.co.ug/
All Archives can be found at http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/
The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including
attachments if any). The List's Host is not responsible for them in any way.
---------------------------------------
