Hi, I think OC users should be aware that this threat is not part of OC security model. I'm not questioning whether it's right or wrong. It's just about being informed. I'm an happy OC user and I like it very much. Thanks.
- leonardo -------- Forwarded Message -------- > From: Senderek Web Security <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: ownCloud Unencrypted Private Key Exposure > Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2014 08:38:04 +0200 (CEST) > > Senderek Web Security - Security Advisory > > ownCloud Unencrypted Private Key Exposure > ========================================= > > https://senderek.ie/archive/2014/owncloud_unencrypted_private_key_exposure.php > > Revision: 1.00 > Last Updated: 3 Aug 2014 > > > Summary: > > In consequence of an insufficient threat model, ownCloud is storing > all user's > private RSA keys in clear text in PHP session files. > These unencrypted private keys can be accessed by every web > application that > has the privilege of the web server user. The affected files > exposing cryptographic > keys will be stored in the PHP session directory for a number of > hours until they > are removed. > > This issue was reported to ownCloud via encrypted email on Tue, 11 > Mar 2014. > I received a reply to this report from the vendor on Wed, 12 Mar > 2014. > > On Tue, 22 July 2014 the vendor confirmed, that they will not > address this problem, > because the protection of user encrypted files from remote attackers > that have > read access to the file system with web server privilege is not - > and will not be - > part of their threat model. Consequently, the vendor does not > consider this to be > a vulnerability or security issue. > > Severity: High > > > Affected Software Versions: > > All versions of ownCloud since the introduction of the encryption > module in > version 5.0.7 including version 7.0.0. > > > Impact: > > An attacker, who is able to read the PHP session files by exploiting > another web > application that is running on the ownCloud server, will be able to > gather the > unencrypted private key of every ownCloud user. > All encrypted files that are stored in a user's home directory can > be decrypted > with this RSA private key, stored in the PHP session files in plain > text. > If the user's encrypted files are synced to other devices or shared > with > other servers - for hosting or backup - an attacker will be able to > decrypt all > user data that is being intercepted, even if the attacker has no > longer access to > the server's file system. > > > Fixes: > > In addition to the ownCloud encryption module users are advised to > encrypt their > sensitive files separately with a standard server-side encryption > mechanism like > GnuPG using a passphrase, that is not stored on the server except > while being used > in memory. > > One software solution that extends ownCloud with GnuPG-based > server-side encryption > can be downloaded here: > > https://senderek.ie/downloads/release/cloud/wee-owncloud.tar > > A detailed installation tutorial is available at: > > https://senderek.ie/wee/cloud/wee-owncloud.php > > This general web application extension addresses a more > comprehensive threat model, > that includes the possibility of read-access to web server > accessible files on the > server. However, it does not protect against malicious actions of > server admins, > as this cannot be prevented by web applications. > > > Security Advice Policy: > > Complete information about reporting security vulnerabilities can be > found here: > > https://senderek.ie/responsible.disclosure.policy.php > > All information in this security advisory is copyrighted because of > the time and > effort in analysing and documenting the vulnerability described here. > >
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