----- Original Message ----- From: "Orit Levin (LCA)" <[email protected]> To: "Alexey Melnikov" <[email protected]>; "Yaron Sheffer" <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, October 06, 2014 8:16 PM > > > So we could: > > > > > > 1. Say explicitly that opportunistic TLS is out of scope. > > > 2. Or say explicitly that it is in scope, and with the same requirements as > > "regular" TLS. > > > 3. Or come up with a different set of requirements for opportunistic TLS. > > > > > > I tend towards #2, because: > > +1. Simplicity is our friend here. > > > As an individual: +1 for the same reason. If needed, the BCP can be revised in the future. > As a chair: when you mention the "opportunistic encryption/security" in the document for the first time, please, add the reference to the relevant draft https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dukhovni-opportunistic-security/.
Well, no. Opportunistic xxxxxx got a fair bit of discussion on the main IETF list and what we have ended up with is opportunistic security. Opportunistic encryption has yet to be defined; it makes no appearance in the I-D you cite. Opportunistic TLS is defined in http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-12.txt but as a deprecated concept, to be replaced by the term 'opportunistic DANE TLS' which is regarded as a superior approach. It is tricky trying to coordinate terminology across different WGs:-( Tom Petch > > Thanks, > Orit. > > _______________________________________________ > Uta mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta > _______________________________________________ Uta mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
