On Thu, Oct 09, 2014 at 09:58:59AM +0100, t.p. wrote:
> Well, that is what you have in your I-D, that is what you are proposing.
> The question I raise is whether or not that definition of opportunistic
> TLS is the one that UTA wants to use
I thought we weren't going to debate those definitions just yet.
Perhaps we should keep it that way?
> and your I-D does state that
>
> "When a TLS-encrypted communication channel is not
> available, message transmission takes place in the clear. "
>
> - is not our primary consideration i.e. the definition given of
> Opportunistic TLS in the I-D is not appropriate for UTA.
The definition is grounded in current practice, SMTP, XMPP, ...
start in the clear and optionally (when possible) upgrade to TLS.
If UTA arrives at definitions not grounded in that practice, that
will limit the relevance of UTA.
The WG is of course free to choose which problems to tackle and
which to leave unaddressed. Still hoping we don't digress in this
direction just yet.
Rather, for the current draft, the decision is it seems whether to
describe which recommendations don't apply to opportunistic TLS,
or whether to simply leave opportunistic TLS out of scope, and
therefore take care to not claim applicability to MTA-to-MTA SMTP,
Server-to-Server XMPP, etc.
--
Viktor.
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