On 5/10/18 10:36 AM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
The real concern is for domains that have MTA-STS policy. A forged TXT record should not be able to redirect the policy to a different source. If a domain has no MTA-STS policy, then a failure to reserve the mta-sts hostname might allow someone to register that subdomain, but that someone would still to MiTM the TXT record, and they could instead MiTM the MX records.
Right. It's the fact that anyone who can replace the TXT record could also replace the MX record that, I think, undermines the argument about sending MTAs to the wrong STS policy server. I don't see an attack here that is more powerful than other attacks that someone with the same capabilities could launch.
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