Hiya,

I had a read of this. Seems to me to be in fine shape but
a couple of comments below. If those have already been
discussed, apologies, and do ignore 'em.

I don't think any of my comments need addressing before
publication, but figured it was no harm sending 'em
anyway:-)

- section 3.2: I wondered why no mention of MTA-STS or
  DANE? Could/should we say that MTA implementations
  SHOULD include support for such strictness?

- 4.2: there's been some cfrg [1] discussion (but not much
  and without so far reaching a conclusion) on deterministic
  signatures (RFC6979) and fault injection attacks. I wonder
  if we want to say anything about that? It might be worth
  just adding a reference that describes the problem, but
  I don't think we can expect the cfrg discussion to have
  resolved before this gets published. Those attacks are
  probably not that important for a typical TLS server but
  more interesting for small devices with TLS servers so
  maybe it's a bit too niche a concern to include?

- 7.4: is it still true that "many TLS implementations
  reuse Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
  exponents across multiple connections"? If not, then
  maybe s/many/some/ or cast the sentence into the past
  tense?

- refs: is rfc6125 still the right reference given the -bis
  work?

- refs: The 2015 date for the bettercrypto.org seems wrong.
  I guess that site has been updated since? It says 2018 on
  their front page anyway, but I'm not sure what'd be the
  right reference.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/113/materials/slides-113-cfrg-signatures-deterministic-vs-randomized-00

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