On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 11:43:41PM +0200, Liran Alon wrote:
> 
> 
> > On 20 Mar 2019, at 16:09, Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:23:36PM +0200, Liran Alon wrote:
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> On 20 Mar 2019, at 12:25, Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>> 
> >>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 01:25:58AM +0200, Liran Alon wrote:
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>>> On 19 Mar 2019, at 23:19, Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 08:46:47AM -0700, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, 19 Mar 2019 14:38:06 +0200
> >>>>>> Liran Alon <liran.a...@oracle.com> wrote:
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> b.3) cloud-init: If configured to perform network-configuration, it 
> >>>>>>> attempts to configure all available netdevs. It should avoid however 
> >>>>>>> doing so on net-failover slaves.
> >>>>>>> (Microsoft has handled this by adding a mechanism in cloud-init to 
> >>>>>>> blacklist a netdev from being configured in case it is owned by a 
> >>>>>>> specific PCI driver. Specifically, they blacklist Mellanox VF driver. 
> >>>>>>> However, this technique doesn’t work for the net-failover mechanism 
> >>>>>>> because both the net-failover netdev and the virtio-net netdev are 
> >>>>>>> owned by the virtio-net PCI driver).
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Cloud-init should really just ignore all devices that have a master 
> >>>>>> device.
> >>>>>> That would have been more general, and safer for other use cases.
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Given lots of userspace doesn't do this, I wonder whether it would be
> >>>>> safer to just somehow pretend to userspace that the slave links are
> >>>>> down? And add a special attribute for the actual link state.
> >>>> 
> >>>> I think this may be problematic as it would also break legit use case
> >>>> of userspace attempt to set various config on VF slave.
> >>>> In general, lying to userspace usually leads to problems.
> >>> 
> >>> I hear you on this. So how about instead of lying,
> >>> we basically just fail some accesses to slaves
> >>> unless a flag is set e.g. in ethtool.
> >>> 
> >>> Some userspace will need to change to set it but in a minor way.
> >>> Arguably/hopefully failure to set config would generally be a safer
> >>> failure.
> >> 
> >> Once userspace will set this new flag by ethtool, all operations done by 
> >> other userspace components will still work.
> > 
> > Sorry about being unclear, the idea would be to require the flag on each 
> > ethtool operation.
> 
> Oh. I have indeed misunderstood your previous email then. :)
> Thanks for clarifying.
> 
> > 
> >> E.g. Running dhclient without parameters, after this flag was set, will 
> >> still attempt to perform DHCP on it and will now succeed.
> > 
> > I think sending/receiving should probably just fail unconditionally.
> 
> You mean that you wish that somehow kernel will prevent Tx on net-failover 
> slave netdev
> unless skb is marked with some flag to indicate it has been sent via the 
> net-failover master?

We can maybe avoid binding a protocol socket to the device?

> This indeed resolves the group of userspace issues around performing DHCP on 
> net-failover slaves directly (By dracut/initramfs, dhclient and etc.).
> 
> However, I see a couple of down-sides to it:
> 1) It doesn’t resolve all userspace issues listed in this email thread. For 
> example, cloud-init will still attempt to perform network config on 
> net-failover slaves.
> It also doesn’t help with regard to Ubuntu’s netplan issue that creates udev 
> rules that match only by MAC.


How about we fail to retrieve mac from the slave?

> 2) It brings non-intuitive customer experience. For example, a customer may 
> attempt to analyse connectivity issue by checking the connectivity
> on a net-failover slave (e.g. the VF) but will see no connectivity when 
> in-fact checking the connectivity on the net-failover master netdev shows 
> correct connectivity.
> 
> The set of changes I vision to fix our issues are:
> 1) Hide net-failover slaves in a different netns created and managed by the 
> kernel. But that user can enter to it and manage the netdevs there if wishes 
> to do so explicitly.
> (E.g. Configure the net-failover VF slave in some special way).
> 2) Match the virtio-net and the VF based on a PV attribute instead of MAC. 
> (Similar to as done in NetVSC). E.g. Provide a virtio-net interface to get 
> PCI slot where the matching VF will be hot-plugged by hypervisor.
> 3) Have an explicit virtio-net control message to command hypervisor to 
> switch data-path from virtio-net to VF and vice-versa. Instead of relying on 
> intercepting the PCI master enable-bit
> as an indicator on when VF is about to be set up. (Similar to as done in 
> NetVSC).
> 
> Is there any clear issue we see regarding the above suggestion?
> 
> -Liran

The issue would be this: how do we avoid conflicting with namespaces
created by users?

> > 
> >> Therefore, this proposal just effectively delays when the net-failover 
> >> slave can be operated on by userspace.
> >> But what we actually want is to never allow a net-failover slave to be 
> >> operated by userspace unless it is explicitly stated
> >> by userspace that it wishes to perform a set of actions on the 
> >> net-failover slave.
> >> 
> >> Something that was achieved if, for example, the net-failover slaves were 
> >> in a different netns than default netns.
> >> This also aligns with expected customer experience that most customers 
> >> just want to see a 1:1 mapping between a vNIC and a visible netdev.
> >> But of course maybe there are other ideas that can achieve similar 
> >> behaviour.
> >> 
> >> -Liran
> >> 
> >>> 
> >>> Which things to fail? Probably sending/receiving packets?  Getting MAC?
> >>> More?
> >>> 
> >>>> If we reach
> >>>> to a scenario where we try to avoid userspace issues generically and
> >>>> not on a userspace component basis, I believe the right path should be
> >>>> to hide the net-failover slaves such that explicit action is required
> >>>> to actually manipulate them (As described in blog-post). E.g.
> >>>> Automatically move net-failover slaves by kernel to a different netns.
> >>>> 
> >>>> -Liran
> >>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> -- 
> >>>>> MST
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