Posted by Todd Zywicki:
WINE WARS, PART 3--THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE:

   As noted in Wine Wars, Part 2, nothing in the text of the 21st
   Amendment specifically repeals the dormant Commerce Clause, nor does
   it specifically repeal only the dormant Commerce Clause and no other
   provision of the Constitution. Nonetheless, some conservatives have
   argued that the dormant Commerce Clause is not "in" the Constitution
   but is rather a figment of the judicial imagination made up by the
   Supreme Court. So as a result, all the 21st Amendment supposedly does
   is make this judicial gloss inapplicable in the context of the 21st
   Amendment. This view is hinted at in the opening line of Judge
   Easterbrook's opinion in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, "This case
   pits the twenty-first amendment, which appears in the Constitution,
   against the `dormant commerce clause,' which does not."
   Moreover, I have heard many conservatives insist that Justices Scalia
   and Thomas do not believe in the dormant commerce clause, so that all
   the 21st Amendment supposedly does is repeal this illegitimate
   judicial usurpation of state authority. This view is incorrect on many
   grounds. First, it proves too much, in that it would repeal any
   supposedly nontextual right or power, regardless of its history or
   foundation in the structure of the Constitution. Second, it conflates
   two different prongs of the dormant Commerce Clause, the
   well-established nondiscrimination principle and more controversial
   balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church.
   First, a primary purpose of the Constitution was prohibit the states
   from engaging in the type of protectionism and economic warfare the
   prevailed under the Articles of Confederation. "If there was any one
   object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it
   was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all
   invidious and partial restraints." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)
   (Johnson, J., concurring). Indeed, concerns about state protectionism
   "the immediate cause, that led to the forming of a [constitutional]
   convention." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 224. Madison himself justified the
   grant of Commerce Clause authority to the federal government as,
   "[growing] out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in
   taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and
   preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves."
   Moreover, it is not sufficient to simply argue that ambiguous textual
   commands (such as section 2 of the 21st Amendment) should trump
   constitutional constructions just because they are nontextual. If this
   were so, then it would mean, for instance, that the 21st Amendment
   would repeal the incorporation doctrine, or the so-called "reverse
   incorporation" doctrine of Bolling v. Sharpe. Indeed, this would mean
   that the 21st Amendment would also repeal cases such as McCullough v.
   Maryland in the context of alcohol. Indeed, this rationale would
   render the unwritten doctrine of Marbury v. Madison itself invalid in
   cases involving the 21st Amendment. There is no indication that the
   framers of the 21st Amendment intended these absurd result, and it
   would be contrary to all accepted principles of constitutional
   interpretation to infer such absurd results absent some congressional
   indication to the contrary.
   Second, the hostility of some conservatives to the dormant Commerce
   Clause is based on a confusion between two different prongs of the
   dormant Commerce Clause, the nondiscrimination principle on one hand,
   and the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church on the other. Under
   Pike, the Court weighs the benefits of the state regulation against
   the costs it imposes on interstate commerce. Scalia has properly
   criticized this doctrine as lacking intellectual coherence and of
   turning the court into a super-legislature weighing the policy wisdom
   of state enactments.
   Although Justice Scalia has consistently criticized the Pike balancing
   test, he has consistently recognized the nondiscrimination principle.
   Writing the opinion for the Court in New Energy v. Limbach, for
   instance, he wrote, , "It has long been accepted that the Commerce
   Clause ... directly limits the power of the States to discriminate
   against interstate commerce. This `negative' aspect of the Commerce
   Clause prohibits economic protectionism - that is, regulatory measures
   designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
   out-of-state competitors." New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
   273 (1988).
   More precisely, Scalia concurred in Healy, noting that even though the
   price scheme there dealt with alcoholic beverages, the 21st Amendment
   did not save it, "since its discriminatory character eliminates the
   immunity afforded by the Twenty-first Amendment."
   Justice Thomas has also questioned the textual foundation of the
   dormant Commerce Clause, but he has not questioned the constitutional
   foundation of the nondiscrimination principle. In Camps Newfound, for
   instance, he trashes the dormant Commerce Clause, but makes clear that
   he would still apply the dormant Commerce Clause, just doing so under
   the Import-Export Clause, which he would apply to interstate commerce
   as well foreign trade. Thus, he says, "our rule that state taxes that
   discriminate against interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid
   under the negative Commerce Clause may well approximate the apparent
   prohibition of the Import-Export Clause itself." 520 U.S. at 636.
   Thus, although Scalia and Thomas would both abandon the balancing test
   of Pike, it is clear that they both believe that the ban on
   protectionism is well-grounded in the Constitution, although Thomas
   would anchor it in the Import-Export Clause instead of the dormant
   Commerce Clause. (As an aside, Cass Sunstein offers an interesting and
   persuasive defense of the Pike test, rooted in the nondiscrimination
   principle. Sunstein argues that where the burden on interstate
   commerce of a regulation manifestly outweigh the benefits, this
   supports an inference that the real intent of the law is protectionism
   and thus unconstitutional. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
   Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1689-92 (1984)).

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