Posted by Eugene Volokh:
S.F. mayor not entitled to conduct same-sex marriages:

   So holds the [1]California Supreme Court, in an opinion that I'm just
   starting to read. Here's [2]Howard Bashman's (How Appealing) summary:

     The vote on declaring previously performed marriages void was 5-2;
     the court was unanimous in holding that the Mayor of San Francisco
     lacks the power going forward to allow same-sex couples to marry in
     violation of existing California law. As a small consolation,
     same-sex couples whose marriages are dissolved as a result of
     today's ruling are entitled to a refund, upon request, of all
     marriage-related fees that they have paid.

   And here's the court's introduction:

     We assumed jurisdiction in these original writ proceedings to
     address an important but relatively narrow legal issue -- whether a
     local executive official who is charged with the ministerial duty
     of enforcing a state statute exceeds his or her authority when,
     without any court having determined that the statute is
     unconstitutional, the official deliberately declines to enforce the
     statute because he

     or she determines or is of the opinion that the statute is
     unconstitutional.

     In the present case, this legal issue arises out of the refusal of
     local officials in the City and County of San Francisco to enforce
     the provisions of California's marriage statutes that limit the
     granting of a marriage license and marriage certificate only to a
     couple comprised of a man and a woman. The same legal issue and the
     same applicable legal principles could come into play, however, in
     a multitude of situations. For example, we would face the same
     legal issue if the statute in question were among those that
     restrict the possession or require the registration of assault
     weapons, and a local official, charged with the ministerial duty of
     enforcing those statutes, refused to apply their provisions because
     of the official's view that they violate the Second Amendment of
     the federal Constitution. In like manner, the same legal issue
     would be presented if the statute were one of the environmental
     measures that impose restrictions upon a property owner's ability
     to obtain a building permit for a development that interferes with
     the public's access to the California coastline, and a local
     official, charged with the ministerial duty of issuing building
     permits, refused to apply the statutory limitations because of his
     or her belief that they effect an uncompensated "taking" of
     property in violation of the just compensation clause of the state
     or federal Constitution.

     Indeed, another example might illustrate the point even more
     clearly: the same legal issue would arise if the statute at the
     center of the controversy were the recently enacted provision
     (operative January 1, 2005) that imposes a ministerial duty upon
     local officials to accord the same rights and benefits to
     registered domestic partners as are granted to spouses (see Fam.
     Code, � 297.5, added by Stats. 2003, ch. 421, � 4)), and a local
     official -- perhaps an officeholder in a locale where domestic
     partnership rights are unpopular -- adopted a policy of refusing to
     recognize or accord to registered domestic partners the equal
     treatment mandated by statute, based solely upon the official's
     view (unsupported by any judicial determination) that the statutory
     provisions granting such rights to registered domestic partners are
     unconstitutional because they improperly amend or repeal the
     provisions of the voter-enacted initiative measure commonly known
     as Proposition 22, the California Defense of Marriage Act (Fam.
     Code, � 308.5) without a confirming vote of the electorate, in
     violation of article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the
     California Constitution.

     As these various examples demonstrate, although the present
     proceeding may be viewed by some as presenting primarily a question
     of the substantive legal rights of same-sex couples, in actuality
     the legal issue before us implicates the interest of all
     individuals in ensuring that public officials execute their
     official duties in a manner that respects the limits of the
     authority granted to them as officeholders. In short, the legal
     question at issue -- the scope of the authority entrusted to our
     public officials -- involves the determination of a fundamental
     question that lies at the heart of our political system: the role
     of the rule of law in a society that justly prides itself on being
     "a government of laws, and not of men" (or women). . . .

     To avoid any misunderstanding, we emphasize that the substantive
     question of the constitutional validity of California's statutory
     provisions limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman
     is not before our court in this proceeding, and our decision in
     this case is not intended, and should not be interpreted, to
     reflect any view on that issue. We hold only that in the absence of
     a judicial determination that such statutory provisions are
     unconstitutional, local executive officials lacked authority to
     issue marriage licenses to, solemnize marriages of, or register
     certificates of marriage for same-sex couples, and marriages
     conducted between same-sex couples in violation of the applicable
     statutes are void and of no legal effect. Should the applicable
     statutes be judicially determined to be unconstitutional in the
     future, same-sex couples then would be free to obtain valid
     marriage licenses and enter into valid marriages.

   The second to last paragraph may be controversial, and probably should
   be: There's a good argument that all government officials should have
   an independent duty to follow the state and federal Constitutions as
   they understand them -- at least absent a clear court order to the
   contrary -- and not just do what they think (rightly or wrongly) is
   unconstitutional simply because no court has yet held it
   unconstitutional. On the other hand, the California Constitution does
   have a special provision on this point (art. III, sec. 3.5) that
   supports the California Supreme Court's position if one treats a mayor
   as an "administrative agency," "An administrative agency, including an
   administrative agency created by the Constitution or an initiative
   statute, has no power: (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or
   refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of its being
   unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination
   that such statute is unconstitutional. . . ."

   But in any event, I think the court's introduction is pretty effective
   rhetorically, both accurately describing the legal issue for readers,
   and defending it against some of the most obvious political
   criticisms. If I were writing a textbook on judicial rhetoric, I'd
   probably include this as a good example.

References

   1. http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S122923.PDF
   2. 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/howappealing/2004_08_01_appellateblog_archive.html#109233005844293855

_______________________________________________
Volokh mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://highsorcery.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volokh

Reply via email to