Posted by Einer Elhauge, guest-blogging:
The Death of Doctrinalism and Its Implications for the Entry-Level Job Market 
at Law Schools.  
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_05_20-2007_05_26.shtml#1179757913


   Doctrinalism is dead. One cannot get a job at a top law school
   nowadays as a doctrinal scholar. Or, to put it more precisely, you
   have to be ten times as good to get a job as a doctrinal scholar as to
   get one as an interdisciplinary scholar. And even then you cannot get
   hired at Yale.

   Now by doctrinalism I do not mean any scholarship that considers
   doctrine or takes it seriously. I rather mean the sort of scholarship
   that simply describes doctrine or that assesses doctrine based solely
   on formalistic grounds having to do with the logic of it internal
   structure. It would not, in my book, be doctrinalism to analyze the
   functional theories that could explain some doctrine or lead to reform
   of it, or to measure the consequences of doctrine. Heck, that is what
   I do, and I am not about to declare myself obsolete.

   Doctrinalism is dead for a very good reason. It is either too easy or
   mistaken. The variety of doctrinalism that is too easy consists of the
   purely descriptive articles. To be sure, good descriptive legal
   articles require hard work by very-smart, highly-trained lawyers. But
   the problem is that those sorts of persons are in relatively high
   supply compared to those who can come up with original ideas or
   empirical findings, so that such work is not going to get much credit
   in legal academia, even though it can be quite useful.

   The part that is mistaken is the variety of doctrinalism that tries to
   explain legal results or predict future decisions based purely on
   formalistic logic. Devoid of any underlying functional theory, these
   theories turn out to offer little real explanation and serve as poor
   predictors. The formalisms are just too easy to spin in multiple
   directions, and we need some underlying theory to explain where the
   fault lines are likely to be and how judges and lawmakers are likely
   to be inclined to resolve them.

   The one odd exception is Constitutional Law, where doctrinalism still
   appears to be alive and kicking. I suppose the reason for its
   exceptional status is that we have nine old persons on the Supreme
   Court who seem persuaded by doctrinal arguments and have immense power
   to impose results on the rest of us through constitutional decisions,
   however poor their underlying policy analysis.

   But for the rest of us, the seriousness with which many constitutional
   scholars still take the task of parsing the precise language of
   Supreme Court cases that were largely written by law clerks is fairly
   astonishing and more than a little quaint. Thus, we have the oddity
   that the marquee legal subject, constitutional law, is also the least
   intellectually respected among law professors because it is the most
   doctrinal.

   In any event, no law school aims to hire constitutional law scholars
   on the entry-level job market, so trying to make it as a doctrinalist
   is a nonstarter. But this raises a problem, because much of law school
   is spent becoming trained in doing doctrinal analysis. All the good
   professors also teach theory, but usually not enough theory to make
   students well-trained in doing the sort of interdisciplinary
   scholarship one needs to do to get a professorship at a top law
   school. And as I mentioned in my last post, much of the modern action
   is in empirical analysis of law, and practically none of us teach how
   to do that in our law classes.

   So how can one overcome this entry barrier? One way is to get both a
   JD and a PhD. This has described the lion�s share of entry level hires
   made at Harvard recently. But while this has been a successful
   approach for us, it creates problems as a systemic approach because
   very few people get both a JD and a PhD, and whenever one limits the
   pool of persons from which one picks, one may not get persons with as
   much raw talent and creativity as if one drew from a broader pool.
   Much of the most interesting work of the past generation was, after
   all, done by persons who had a JD but no PhD. One would not want to
   screen out the next generation�s Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Frank
   Michelman, Mark Roe, Bill Stuntz, Ronald Dworkin, Larry Lessig, Guido
   Calabresi, Bob Ellickson, Bill Eskridge, Alan Schwartz, or Bruce
   Ackerman, just because they had no PhD. At least I wouldn�t.

   The solution, towards which law schools are steadily moving, is
   expanding programs for fellowships in law. These fellowships were
   nonexistent in my time, when people like me got law jobs at top
   schools like Berkeley based on a job talk jotted down on notecards
   late at night after working as a clerk. (Not everything was tougher in
   the old days, despite what us old fogeys like to say.) Since then,
   these fellowships have exploded.

   I run one program, the [1]Harvard Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law
   Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics, that will have eight academic
   fellows next year, earning $60,000 per year for developing their own
   scholarship in this crucial area, where the supply of academic
   candidates has historically fallen far short of law school demand.
   Harvard�s Climenko Fellowship adds another fourteen. There are Olin
   Fellows, Berkman Fellows, and Houston fellows and probably many more I
   am missing. And that is just at Harvard.

   These fellowships provide a vital opportunity for aspiring legal
   academics to steep themselves enough in modern legal theory or
   empirical analysis to be able to demonstrate some ability to do the
   sort of nondoctrinal interdisciplinary scholarship the modern academic
   law market demands. In the future, look for these fellowships to
   become more and more regularized into a form of quasi-necessary
   post-doc, with law schools looking mainly to them and to PhD programs
   for their entry level hires.

   What, though, are the implications of the death of doctrinalism for
   the laterals market? That will be the subject of my posting tomorrow.

References

   1. http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/petrie-flom/

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